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I. INTRODUCTION
A woman is arrested for inserting money into expired parking
meters after a police officer ordered her not to do so.1 A truck driver
uses his CB radio to alert other drivers of a police speed trap.2 A
member of a political activist group releases crickets at a public
auction.3 A person swallows illegal contraband as he is being
pursued by police.4 A child shouts obscenities at his public school
teacher, shoves her, and leaves the classroom.5 Two middle-aged
women privately state that they believe a recent arson was committed
by the local police.6 Although these activities varied widely, they
resulted in similar criminal charges; each person was charged with
some form of obstruction of justice.
When many people consider the offense "obstruction of justice,"
they probably think of conduct such as evidence destruction and
tampering with witnesses, jurors, and others involved in the judicial
process. While such beliefs would be correct, these conceptions
would be incomplete. As the above cases suggest, obstruction
statutes have been interpreted to prohibit a broad range of activities.
Since the Enron scandal erupted, the federal obstruction of justice
laws have been used to prosecute many highly-publicized white
collar criminals, such as Martha Stewart At the state level,
Copyright 2004, by LouIsIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. J.D., Creighton
University; L.L.M., J.S.D. New York University. The author wishes to
acknowledge the outstanding support provided by student research assistant
Christopher M. Kopacz, Class of 2005.
1. State v. Stayton, 709 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
2. People v. Case, 365 N.E.2d 872, 873-74 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977).
3. People v. Spiegel, 693 N.Y.S.2d 393, 395 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1999).
4. People v. Ravizee, 552 N.Y.S.2d 503, 504 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1990); see
also People v. Smith, 786 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (111. App. Ct. 2003).
5. In re Walter S., 337 N.Y.S.2d 774, 775-76 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1972).
6. See Becky Sisco, Stockton Women Guilty of'Gossiping', Telegraph Herald,
Oct. 4, 2002, at A3.
7. See Constance L. Hays & Jonathan D. Glater, More Tactics Than Theatrics
at the Stewart Trial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2004, at Al (discussing the obstruction
of justice charge against Martha Stewart based on her alleged alteration of a
telephone log); see also Jonathan D. Glater, Mistrial Shows Risks in Choosing A
Path for Prosecution, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 2003, at C1 (describing the mistrial in
the case against Frank Quattrone, a former investment banker, who was charged
with obstructing justice after he sent an e-mail to his colleagues, encouraging them
to "clean up those files" while a grand jury investigation was underway);
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obstruction laws have been used increasingly against drug offenders
who, in some fashion, attempt to destroy or conceal their drugs when
being pursued by police.8
This article will illustrate the broad reach of the crime of
obstruction at the federal and the state levels through an examination
of the statutes and the case law. Part II provides a brief background
to obstruction of justice. Part 111 examines the federal obstruction of
justice statutes with particular emphasis on the omnibus clause, the
broadest provision of the various strictures. Part 1V categorizes and
describes the numerous state approaches to prohibiting obstruction.
Then, Part V analyzes the state case law interpreting the broadest
obstruction statutes. Finally, Part VI contains general observations
about the broad federal and state obstruction statutes and suggests
ways in which the statutes could be restricted.
II. BACKGROUND
In a broad sense, any offense negatively affecting government
functions can be viewed as an obstruction against the administration
of justice. For example, treason, sedition, perjury, bribery, escape,
contempt, false personation, destruction of government property, and
assault of a public official are crimes against the government. 9
Moreover, as the number of governmental functions has increased
throughout time, the number of statutory offenses penalizing
obstructions of those functions likewise has increased.' ° Many of
these crimes have been clearly and distinctly set apart as separate
offenses and are beyond the scope of this article. The focus of this
article, instead, is the more narrow laws, which either in general
Associated Press, Ex-Lawyer for Rite Aid is Found Guilty, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18,
2003, at C2 (describing the obstruction of justice conviction of Franklin Brown for
misleading investigators looking into accounting fraud at Brown's company); Kurt
Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron, N.Y. Times, June
16, 2002, at Al (discussing the obstruction of justice conviction against the
accounting firm Arthur Andersen based upon the firm's hindrance of the
investigation into Enron' s accounting practices). One former federal prosecutor has
noted that, in cases of white collar crime, the obstruction of justice laws have
become a "dream" for prosecutors, because obstruction is an easier charge to
prosecute than tax or securities crimes. Tamara Loomis, The Challenge of
Prosecuting Obstruction-of-Justice Cases, Texas Lawyer, Jan. 5, 2004, at 1.
8. See People v. Brake, 783 N.E.2d 1084, 1086-87 (I11. App. Ct. 2003)
(swallowing drugs); People v. Vargas, 684 N.Y.S.2d 848,849 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct.
1998) (throwing a marijuana cigarette down a sewer); People v. Simon, 547
N.Y.S.2d 199 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1989) (breaking a glass pipe containing
cocaine).
9. See Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law § 5.3 (3d ed.
1982).
10. Id. at 498.
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terms or specific terms, prohibit what today is popularly called
"obstruction of justice."
MI-. FEDERAL STATUTE AND CASE LAW
Sections 1501 through 1520 of Title 18 in the United States Code
reflect the various provisions outlawing obstruction of justice.
Specifically, the individual sections reflecting substantial criminal
offenses are titled "assault on a process server,"'" "resistance to
extradition agent," 2 "influencing or injuring officer or juror
generally,"13 "influencing juror by writing,"14 "obstruction of
proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees,"'15 "theft
or alteration of records or process; false bail,"' 6 "picketing or
parading," 7 "recording, listening to, or observing proceedings of grand
or petit juries while deliberating or voting,"' 8 "obstruction of court
orders, ... "obstruction of criminal investigations,"'20 "obstruction of
State or local law enforcement," 2' "tampering with a witness, victim,
or an informant,"2 2 "retaliating against a witness, victim, or an
informant, ' 23  "obstruction of Federal audit,, 24  "obstructing
examination of financial institution,"25 "obstruction of criminal
investigations of health care offenses, ' 26 "destruction, alteration, or
falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy, ' 27 and
"destruction of corporate audit records." 28  Beyond the above
provisions are two other sections, one which reflects a civil action
measure29 and another that sets out basic definitions.30
The central provision in this statutory arrangement is section
1503. Inasmuch as the majority of federal prosecutions for
11. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1501 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1502 (2000).
13. Id. § 1503.
14. Id. § 1504.
15. Id. § 1505.
16. Id. § 1506.
17. Id. § 1507.
18. Id. § 1508.
19. Id. § 1509.
20. Id. § 1510.
21. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1511 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
22. Id. § 1512.
23. Id. § 1513.
24. Id. § 1516.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1517 (2000).
26. Id. § 1518.
27. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1519 (Supp. 2003).
28. Id. § 1520.
29. Id. § 1514.
30. Id. § 1515.
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obstruction of justice are based on this section, the discussion that
follows will focus on this offense.
A. The Obstruction of Justice Omnibus Clause
1. The Clause Codified
Section 1503 of Title 18, titled "Influencing or injuring officer or
juror generally," provides: "Whoever ... corruptly or by threats of
force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences,
obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede,
the due administration of justice, shall be punished."31 This so-called
omnibus clause is the broadest of the various obstruction of justice
crimes, serving "as a catchall, prohibiting persons from endeavoring to
influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice.""
2. Elements of the Offense
Most courts agree that there are three elements to a charge of
obstruction of justice: (1) there must be a judicial proceeding pending,
(2) the defendant must have knowledge of the proceeding, and (3) the
defendant must have corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct, or
impede the due administration of justice. These elements will be
discussed accordingly.
a. Pending Judicial Proceeding
The first element of the obstruction of justice omnibus clause is
that there be a pending judicial proceeding that qualifies as an
"administration of justice."33  Courts have often refrained from
developing a "rigid rule" to determine at what point a judicial
proceeding becomes pending.34 An investigation by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation or a similar government agency clearly is not
a pending judicial proceeding because it is not a "judicial arm" of the
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000).
32. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 2361-62
(1995).
33. United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206, 208 (3d Cir. 1979). But see
United States v. Novak, 217 F.3d 566,571-72 (8th Cir. 2000) (questioning whether
section 1503 imposes a pending judicial proceeding requirement).
34. See United States v. Vesich, 724 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1975).
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government involved in the administration of justice.35
Consequently, the issuance of investigative tools used by law
enforcement officials, such as search warrants36 and wiretaps,' does
not constitute a pending judicial proceeding.38
On the other hand, a grand jury investigation does qualify as a
pending judicial proceeding.3 9 If a grand jury investigation is
conducted jointly with another federal agency, such as the United
States Attorney, a judicial proceeding is pending.' Likewise, a
judicial proceeding was found to be pending where investigations by
the Internal Revenue Service and a grand jury were "one and the
same."
41
An investigation by a law enforcement agency can ripen into a
grand jury investigation, meeting the pending judicial proceeding
requirement.42  In United States v. Simmons,4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a judicial proceeding
becomes pending when agency officials apply for, and cause to be
issued, subpoenas to "secure a presently contemplated presentation
of evidence before the grand jury."' In that case, a subpoena had
been issued upon application of an Assistant United States Attorney
for the defendant to appear before a grand jury and to bring various
documents with him." The defendant was convicted of obstruction
of justice for destroying those documents and for ordering his
35. Simmons, 591 F.2d at 208. See also Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S. Ct. at
2362 ("[Ilt is not enough that there be an intent to influence some ancillary proceeding,
such as an investigation independent of the court's or grand jury's authority.").
36. United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1982) (where
defendant informed the target of the wiretap order that his associate was "a rat,"
defendant did not obstruct a pending judicial proceeding).
37. United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231,240 (3d Cir. 1999) (where defendant
warned the target of a search warrant in order to prevent discovery and seizure of
drugs, defendant did not interfere with a pending judicial proceeding).
38. But see United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding that judicial proceeding was pending where defendant made false
statements during an interview with a probation officer for oral pre-sentence report
to magistrate, even though complaint not yet filed).
39. United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1975).
40. United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 962 (3d Cir. 1979).
41. United States v. Furkin, 119 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (7th Cir. 1997).
42. United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting
Walasek, 527 F.2d at 678). See also United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 389
(6th Cir. 1998) (holding that a judicial proceeding was pending where a defendant
destroyed documents after subpoenas were issued but before the evidence was
presented to the grand jury).
43. 591 F.2d at 210.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 207.
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employees to withhold information from the grand jury.46 On
appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecution had not proved
that, at the time the subpoenas were issued, the grand jury was
investigating the defendant or had any knowledge of the activities
related to the subpoena.47 The court, however, refused to exonerate
defendants who are "fortunate" enough to receive the first subpoenas
of an investigation before evidence was presented to the grand
jury.48 Such defendants, the court held, will have acted with the
same intent to obstruct justice and the same knowledge of a pending
grand jury investigation.49
Other courts have held that the issuance of subpoenas is not
dispositive in determining whether a judicial proceeding is pending.
For instance, in United States v. Vesich, the defendant was
convicted of obstruction of justice when he encouraged a witness to
testify falsely before a federal grand jury.5" At the time, the witness
had not been subpoenaed, but instead, he had signed an agreement
with an Assistant United States Attorney to testify before the current
grand jury.52 Also, pursuant to the agreement, the witness' state
narcotics charges were dropped, and a federal complaint was filed
against the witness instead. ' On the defendant's appeal of his
conviction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
examined the pending judicial proceeding requirement by
considering the likelihood that the witness would testify in the
future.54 Although the court noted that "these circumstances are
perhaps at the outer edge of the required pendency," the court held
that a jury could find that the attorney and the witness mutually
expected the witness to testify before the federal grand jury, and
thus, a judicial proceeding was pending.55
A judicial proceeding remains pending even after the trial is
complete and until the court is no longer responsible for post-
46. Id.
47. Id. at 208.
48. Id. at 210.
49. Id. See also United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 389 (6th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a judicial proceeding was pending where a defendant destroyed
documents after subpoenas were issued but before the evidence was presented to
the grand jury).
50. 724 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 455.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 455-56.




sentence motions 56 and "until disposition is made of any direct
appeal taken by the defendant assigning error that could result in a
new trial."57 Consequently, where the defendant submitted false
reports to the United States Probation Office within the one-year
period to file a motion to reduce sentence, a judicial proceeding was
found to be pending.58
b. Knowledge of the Proceeding
It is critical for a charge of obstruction of justice that the
defendant has knowledge or notice of the judicial proceedings.5 9
Without this knowledge, the defendant necessarily lacks the requisite
intent to obstruct the administration of justice.60 Mere knowledge of
an investigation is not enough to satisfy the knowledge requirement.6'
For instance, where a defendant knew that a person was the subject
of an FBI investigation, this was insufficient to show the defendant's
knowledge of a grand jury proceeding. 62 In that case, the defendant's
statements that he expected the FBI agent to return with a subpoena
did not show that the defendant knew of a grand jury proceeding
underway at the time as opposed to one that could begin in the
future.63 In a different case, a defendant police officer's knowledge
of a person's status as an informant was insufficient to show that the
defendant knew the informant was involved in a grand jury-based
investigation.6' As the court in that case remarked, "informants and
investigations [can] exist without grand juries. ' '65
The defendant's knowledge of a pending judicial proceeding can
be often inferred from the surrounding facts. For example, a
defendant's knowledge of pending proceedings could be inferred
from the wide sweep of the grand jury's investigation as well as
conversations in which the defendant asked the target of an
investigation whether he was "standing tall" and needing "a lawyer
or any sort of help., 66 Also, where a defendant, an experienced
attorney, stated to a potential witness that "'they was going to have'
him 'before the federal grand jury,"' it could be inferred that the
56. United States v. Novak, 217 F.3d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Fernandez, 837 F.2d 1031, 1034 (1 1th Cir. 1988).
57. United States v. Johnson, 605 F.2d 729, 731 (4th Cir. 1979).
58. Novak, 217 F.3d at 573.
59. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593,599. 115 S. Ct. 2357,2362 (1995).
60. Id.
61. United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 651 (1st Cir. 1996).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 242 (3d Cir. 1999).
65. Id.
66. United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1995).
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defendant knew that a federal grand jury was always sitting, and thus,
had knowledge of a pending judicial proceeding.67 However, one
court has held that the prosecution is not required to prove the
defendant knew that the proceedings were federal in nature.68
c. Corruptly Endeavoring to Obstruct Justice
i. Corruptly
Because the only mental state described in the omnibus clause is
the word "corruptly,, 69 the mens rea required to sustain an
obstruction of justice conviction has been the source of much
confusion. 70 In an 1893 case, Pettibone v. United States,7' the United
States Supreme Court interpreted the predecessor statute to section
1503 as requiring specific intent to obstruct justice.72 The intent
requirement could not be fulfilled by "general malevolence" or
"general evil intent., 73
In the years following Pettibone, some courts seemed to abandon
the specific intent requirement in favor of a less strict formulation of
the mens rea requirement.74 For example, some courts followed the
lead of the Fourth Circuit, which held that the offense required only
knowledge or notice that the defendant's "success ... would have
likely resulted in an obstruction of justice," and such notice was
provided by the "reasonable foreseeability of the natural and probable
consequences of one's acts. 75 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the government was not required to prove specific intent, but
rather that "the conduct was prompted, at least in part, by a 'corrupt
motive.'"76 However, in United States v. Aguilar,7 the United States
Supreme Court seemed to affirm the Pettibone requirement of
67. United States v. Vesich, 724 F.2d 451, 458 (5th Cir. 1984).
68. United States v. Ardito, 782 F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 1986).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000).
70. See Joseph V. De Marco, Note: A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to
the Courthouse: Mens Rea, Document Destruction, and the Federal Obstruction of
Justice Statute, 67 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 570, 576-90 (1992).
71. 148 U.S. 197, 13 S. Ct. 542 (1893).
72. Id. at 207, 13 S. Ct. at 546-47 ("[T]he specific intent to violate the statute
must exist to justify a conviction.").
73. Id. at 207-08, 13 S. Ct. at 547.
74. See De Marco, supra note 70, at 580-90.
75. United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1273 (4th Cir. 1979); see also
United States v. Machi, 811 F.2d 991, 998 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11 th Cir. 1984).
76. United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647,651 (1 th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 713 (11th Cir. 1993).
77. 515 U.S. 593, 115 S. Ct. 2357 (1995).
[Vol. 65
JOHN F. DECKER
specific intent, when it held that a person convicted under section
1503 must have acted "with an intent to influence judicial or grand
jury proceedings."78 Although some courts have continued to follow
pre-Aguilar formulations of the mens rea requirement, 79 the Court's
interpretation seems to require nothing less than specific intent to
obstruct justice.
Intent to obstruct justice normally can be inferred from all
surrounding facts and circumstances.80 However, proof of a motive
alone is insufficient to infer specific intent.8 For example, where the
defendant, a confidential informant in a series of cases, was angry
with his compensation and stated that he would "get amnesia" and
that the government would lose its cases without him, a jury could
infer that the defendant intended to influence the judicial proceedings
in which he was scheduled to testify. 82 Also, where a defendant left
a voice mail message threatening to murder the judge who had
sentenced him and had recently issued a warrant for his arrest, the
defendant's specific intent to thwart his arrest warrant and his
pending hearing could be inferred.83
Where the defendant's acts took place before subpoenas were
issued, this can negate the specific intent to obstruct justice.
Therefore, where the defendant had backdated documents before they
were subpoenaed and submitted to the grand jury, there was no
corrupt intent.84 Similarly, in United States v. Ryan,85 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
defendant's specific intent was not established where the defendant
instructed his secretary to delete a certain name from all club
membership cards, which were later subpoenaed by a grand jury.86
78. Id. at 599, 115 S. Ct. at 2362 (emphasis added). For a discussion of
specific intent, see John F. Decker, 1 Illinois Criminal Law § 2.27 (2000).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1277 (11th Cir. 1997)
("[A]I1 the government has to establish is that the defendant should have reasonably
foreseen that the natural and probable consequence of the success of his scheme
would achieve precisely that result.").
80. United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1236 (2d Cir. 1983).
81. United States v. Littleton, 76 F.3d 614, 619 (4th Cir. 1996) (where the
defendant, who allegedly made false statements while testifying in her son's
suppression hearing, understood the purpose and importance of the hearing and
desired that the court grant the motion, there was insufficient evidence of intent to
obstruct justice).
82. United States v. Russell, 234 F.3d 404, 407 (8th Cir. 2000).
83. United States v. Weber, 320 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003).
84. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1236 (also holding that a stronger case for obstruction
would have been presented if the defendant had affirmatively vouched for the
documents' accuracy or submitted the documents knowing that he could have
resisted production on self-incrimination grounds).
85. 455 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1971).
86. Id. at 734.
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Furthermore, after the cards were received by the government, the
name still appeared on eighteen cards.87 Therefore, the court
concluded that the defendant did not intend to conceal the name from
the grand jury.88
ii. Endeavoring to Obstruct Justice
A defendant fulfills the actus rea requirement of section 1503 by
influencing, obstructing, impeding or endeavoring to influence,
obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice.8 9 Thus, a
defendant's actions need not successfully obstruct justice, since an
"endeavor" to obstruct justice is sufficient.9" An endeavor is often
described as "less than an attempt ' 9' or "any effort or assay to
accomplish the evil purpose the statute was enacted to prevent."92 The
United States Supreme Court, in Aguilar, stated that the term
"endeavor" is used in the statute to punish conduct "where the
defendant acts with an intent to obstruct justice, and in a manner that
is likely to obstruct justice, but is foiled in some way., 93 For example,
the Court stated, a defendant who intends to lie to a subpoenaed
witness who ultimately does not testify has endeavored to obstruct
justice.94 Therefore, where an attorney accepted money from a
recently-convicted defendant, who was not his client, to bribe the
defendant's judge, the attorney's lack of success did not prevent his
conduct from being an endeavor.95
To sustain a conviction, any endeavor, even with the requisite
intent, must have the "natural and probable effect" of interfering with
the due administration of justice.9' The Supreme Court, in Aguilar,
termed this the "'nexus' requirement-that the act must have a
relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial
proceedings. 97  In that case, the defendant was charged with
obstructing justice by providing false statements to an FBI agent.98
However, the agent was not acting as an arm of a grand jury
investigation, and he had not yet been subpoenaed to appear before the
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000).
90. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 2362 (1995).
91. United States v. Buffalano, 727 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1984).
92. United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 1984).
93. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601-02, 115 S. Ct. at 2363.
94. Id. at 602, 115 S. Ct. at 2363.
95. United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213, 1219 (6th Cir. 1997).
96. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S. Ct. at 2362.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 601, 115 S. Ct. at 2363.
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grand jury.99 Therefore, the Court held that the eventual use of such
testimony at the time of the interview was "speculative" and did not
have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due
administration of justice.'0o
The natural and probable effects of the defendant's acts can be
inferred by a jury.1"' For example, where a defendant forged a letter
that included false statements and urged leniency in the defendant's
upcoming supervised release violation hearing, the government was
not required to prove the letter actually obstructed justice. " The letter
had the natural and probable effect of influencing the sentencing judge,
since it was the type the judge normally received and relied upon when
imposing sentences.1"3
What constitutes an endeavor to obstruct justice falls roughly into
four categories of activities: (1) providing false testimony, (2)
destroying or altering documents or other evidence, (3) engaging in
fraudulent schemes, and (4) tampering with a witness. These forms of
conduct will now be explored.
(1) Providing False Testimony
Section 1503 is often used to prosecute defendants who provide
false testimony in a pending judicial proceeding."°4 False testimony
alone cannot provide the basis of an obstruction conviction because
"the function of trial is to sift the truth from a mass of contradictory
evidence, and to do so the fact finding tribunal must hear both truthful
and false witnesses. 105 Even if the false testimony amounts to perjury,
it cannot be the sole evidence in an obstruction conviction because
obstruction requires specific intent to interfere with the due
administration of justice." Some early cases held that it must be
proven that the false statements had the actual effect of obstructing
justice.' °7 However, that additional burden has been essentially
eliminated, since section 1503 has been interpreted broadly to cover all
unsuccessful endeavors to obstruct justice."
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. United States v. Furkin, 119 F.3d 1276, 1283 (7th Cir. 1997).
102. United States v. Collis, 128 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 1997).
103. Id.
104. United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200,204 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The perjurious
witness can bring about a miscarriage of justice by imperiling the innocent or
delaying the punishment of the guilty.").
105. In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227-28, 66 S. Ct. 78, 80 (1945).
106. United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 980 (5th Cir. 1989).
107. See United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1528 (1 lth Cir. 1984); United
States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1979).
108. See United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1990); Williams,
847 F.2d at 980-81.
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The false statement is not required to be presented in court or
delivered to a court officer.' °9 Providing false statements to a grand
jury"' and falsely denying knowledge of certain events to the grand
jury"' can be an endeavor to obstruct justice. Also, where a
confidential informant made false statements to the attorney of the
person against whom the informant was to testify, resulting in a
dismissed charge against that person, this amounted to an endeavor to
obstruct justice."2 Finally, where a defendant made false statements
to a probation officer during an interview and to a magistrate during an
oral presentence report, the defendant was found to have obstructed
justice by receiving an undeserved lenient sentence. 1 3
Where the false statement does not have the natural and probable
effect of obstructing justice, an obstruction charge will not stand. For
instance, where a defendant made unsworn exculpatory false
statements to FBI agents-who were investigating political corruption,
did not expect a complete confession, and eventually learned the truth
about the matter under investigation-the statements did not have the
natural and probable effect of obstructing justice."'
Also, where it is not clear that the allegedly false testimony was, in
fact, untrue, the statements cannot have the natural and probable effect
of impeding justice."' For instance, in United States v. Thomas,"6 the
defendant was asked whether he had known Callahan, the target of an
investigation, by another name or had ever introduced Callahan to
anyone using another name." 7 The defendant responded that he had
not.18 However, there was evidence that the defendant knew that
others referred to the target by another name." 9 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the questions the
defendant answered were too vaguely worded to establish that the
defendant testified falsely. 2 ° The court held that more than the
"conjecture and innuendo" offered as evidence was required to sustain
an obstruction of justice conviction. 2'
109. United States v. Fields, 838 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir. 1988).
110. United States v. Russo, 104 F.3d 431, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Perkins, 748
F.2d at 1528.
111. United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 981; Griffin, 589 F.2d at 204.
112. United States v. Barfield, 999 F.2d 1520, 1520-22 (11th Cir. 1993).
113. United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1984).
114. United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 696-97 (10th Cir. 1993).
115. United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 653 (11 th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Brand, 775 F.2d 1460, 1467-68 (11 th Cir. 1985).
116. 916 F.2d 647.
117. Id. at649.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 649-50.
120. Id. at 654.




(2) Destruction or Alteration of Documents and Other
Evidence
A second act that forms the basis of many obstruction of justice
convictions is the destruction or alteration of documents and other
evidence. For example, where a corporate officer caused records to
be destroyed after learning that the company had been served with a
subpoena, there was an interference with the due administration of
justice. 2 Other similar acts chargeable under section 1503 include
the fabrication of meeting minutes 12 and the alteration of airplane
flight logs. 24
A jury can infer that the defendant had possession of the
documents at the time of the subpoena.1 25 Thus, where a defendant
possessed documents when he was aware that he was the subject of
a grand jury investigation and those later turned up in his attorney's
files, a jury could infer that the defendant had possession of the
documents at the time they were subpoenaed.1
26
(3) Fraudulent Schemes
Fraudulent schemes, typically involving bribery, also may be
charged under the obstruction of justice omnibus clause. The scheme
is not required to be successful because an "endeavor" suffices for
purposes of the statute.1 27 Moreover, fraudulent schemes, even if
unsuccessful, have been held to obstruct justice by having a "lulling
effect" on a party involved.12 8 For example, where an attorney agreed
with a defendant, though not his client, to ensure a lenient sentence
from the presiding judge in exchange for money, the attorney was
subject to obstruction of justice charges.' 29 Although the attorney's
attempt was unsuccessful, it could have lulled the defendant into a
false sense of security and caused him to take a less active role in his
case.1 30 In another case, an attorney could have lulled a defendant by
encouraging him to drop his pending appeal, which the defendant
was entitled to pursue by law.13
122. United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 681 (3d Cit. 1975).
123. United States v. McComb, 744 F.2d 555, 559 (7th Cir. 1984).
124. United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1370 (6th Cir. 1994).
125. United States v. Davis, 752 F.2d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1985).
126. Id.
127. United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213, 1218 (6th Cir. 1997).
128. United States v. Buffalano, 727 F.2d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1984).
129. Id.
130. Id.




Since the enactment of the Victim and Witness Protection Act
(VWPA) in 1982,132 which removed all references to "witnesses"
from section 1503 and made witness tampering a separate offense,
the circuits are divided on whether Congress intended witness
tampering to be removed from the scope of section 1503.' The
Second 13  and Ninth1 35 Circuits have held that Congress, by
eliminating references to "witnesses" in section 1503, intended
witness tampering to be prosecuted only under sections 1512 and
1513. However, the Fourth, 136 Fifth, 137Seventh,' and Eighth 139
Circuits have allowed prosecutions under both section 1503 and a
witness tampering section.
In circuits that have upheld witness tampering prosecutions under
the omnibus clause, a variety of conduct has been reached. For
example, suggesting that a person lie to a grand jury, 140 and
attempting to hire someone to kill a grand jury witness, are forms
of conduct that have been deemed within the reach of section 1503.
Also, where a defendant attempted to bribe a witness and later
threatened the life of the witness' mother, the defendant was found
to have obstructed justice. 42
3. Defenses to Section 1503
Various defenses to a charge under section 1503's omnibus
clause have been presented and will now be discussed briefly.
Constitutional challenges to the statute on grounds of vagueness 143
132. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
1512-1514, 3579 (2000)).
133. See Tina M. Riley, Note, Tampering with Witness Tampering: Resolving
the Quandary Surrounding 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1512,77 Wash. U. L.Q. 249 (1999)
(recommending that witness tampering cases be prosecuted only under section
1512).
134. See United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895, 898-99 (2d Cir. 1984).
135. See United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1484-86 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd
on other grounds, 515 U.S. 593, 115 S. Ct. 2357 (1995).
136. United States v. Kenny, 973 F.2d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 1992).
137. United States v. Wesley, 748 F.2d 962, 964 (5th Cir. 1984).
138. United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809, 824 (7th Cir. 1985).
139. United States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361, 1369 (8th Cir. 1986).
140. United States v. Ladum, 141 F.3d 1328, 1339 (9th Cir. 1998).
141. Risken, 788 F.2d at 1369.
142. United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420, 1422 (1 lth Cir. 1992).
143. See United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 632 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that
"corruptly" is not unconstitutionally vague as applied); United States v. Brenson,
104 F.3d 1267, 1280-81 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that "corruptly" is not
constitutionally vauge as applied).
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and overbreadth'" have been summarily rejected. Also, challenges
to the omnibus clause's application to a defendant's particular
conduct on the grounds of ejusdem generis ("of the same kind") have
generally failed. 45 One possibly successful defense is a fear of
reprisal that negates the "corrupt" mental state required for
obstructing justice. In United States v. Banks, 146 the Eleventh Circuit
held that "within a narrow range of unusual and extreme
circumstances," a defendant could be acquitted of a section 1503
charge based on "a realistic and reasonable perception that giving
testimony would result in imminent harm to the safety of the witness
or members of his family." '147
B. Other Federal Obstruction of Justice Offenses
In addition to the general obstruction of justice provision of
section 1503, Chapter seventy-three also contains seventeen
provisions dealing with specific acts which constitute obstruction of
justice. These sections can be grouped into five categories: (1)
obstruction of persons in the performance of their official duties, (2)
obstruction of judicial proceedings, (3) obstruction of government
agencies, (4) obstruction of government investigations, and (5)
obstruction of law enforcement. These will now be examined briefly.
1. Obstruction of Persons in the Performance of Their Official
Duties
a. Assault on a Process Server
The first of the specific provisions dealing with the obstruction of
persons in the performance of their official duties is section 1501,
titled "assault on process server. 1 48 This provision makes it an
offense to "knowingly and willfully" obstruct, resist or oppose any
officer of the United States or other duly authorized person in
"serving, or attempting to serve or execute, any legal or judicial writ
or process" of any court of the United States, or United States
magistrate judge. 4 The section also makes it an offense to assault,
144. United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980,996-97 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that
section 1503 is not overbroad).
145. United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333-34(5th Cir. 1978) (holding
that section 1503's omnibus clause applied to a defendant who attempted to sell
grand jury transcripts).
146. 942 F.2d 1576 (1lth Cir. 1991).
147. Id. at 1579.




beat, or wound an officer or duly authorized person, in serving or
executing any writ, rule, order, process, warrant of other legal or
judicial writ of process if the person committing the offense knows
that the process server is a federal officer or duly authorized
person.I5 °
Thus, a defendant was found to have obstructed a process server
in violation of section 1501 where he refused to allow a United States
Marshal bearing a proper search warrant to search his property and
threatened to keep the Marshal on the property if the search was
conducted.15 l  However, where police officers knocked on a
defendant's door and requested the presence of someone visiting the
defendant, but the defendant refused to permit the officer's entry
without a warrant, the defendant was exercising her constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and thus,
her section 1501 conviction was overturned.
52
b. Resistance to an Extradition Agent
Congress also has created an offense entitled "resistance to
extradition agent" that makes it an offense for anyone "knowingly
and willfully" to obstruct, resist, or oppose an extradition agent of the
United States in the execution of his duties.'53 Although defendants
often are charged both under section 1502 and section 1503,154 there
are no judicial decisions interpreting this section standing alone.
2. Obstruction of Judicial Proceedings
The second category of obstruction offenses deals with various
acts that obstruct judicial proceedings. The five offenses comprising
this category will now be explored.
a. Influencing a Juror by Writing
Section 1504, called "influencing juror by writing," makes it an
offense for anyone to attempt to influence the action or decision of a
grand or petit juror of any court of the United States on any issue or
matter before the juror or the jury of which he or she is a member by
writing or by sending the juror any written communication in relation
150. Id.
151. United States v. Peifer, 474 F. Supp. 498, 505 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 615
F.2d 1354 (3d Cir. 1980).
152. Miller v. United States, 230 F.2d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 1956).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1502 (2000).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. 975, 1094 (D.N.J. 1994).
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to the issue or matter before the jury. 55 The purpose of this section
is to prevent anyone from attempting to put pressure on or intimidate
a grand juror by written communication. 56 However, this section
does not prohibit the communication of a request to appear before a
grand jury.157
b. Theft or Alteration of a Record or Process and Causing
False Bail to be Entered
Section 1506 covers two separate offenses. First, it makes it a
crime for anyone to "feloniously" steal, take away, alter, falsify, or
otherwise avoid any record, writ, process or other proceedings, in any
court in the United States which results in any judgment being
reversed, voided or not taking effect.' Second, anyone who
"acknowledges or procures to be acknowledged in any such court,
any recognizance, bail or judgment, in the name of any other person
not privy or consenting to the same" is guilty of an offense. 59 For
example, a defendant was convicted under this offense when he
caused false bail to be entered and acknowledged and knew that he
lacked the authority to cause the bonds to be entered.'"
c. Picketing or Parading
Congress also has created an offense simply called, "picketing or
parading," which prohibits anyone "with the intent of interfering
with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice, or with
the intent of influencing any judge, witness, or court officer in the
discharge of his duty" from picketing or parading in or near any
building housing a federal court or any residence occupied by or used
by a judge, juror or court officer. 6' The section also prohibits the use
of sound-trucks or similar devices or the use of any demonstration in
or near any court house or residence.' 62 This section does not prevent
a court from punishing persons for such conduct for contempt.
63
There have been few prosecutions under this section. However,
a court upheld the use of this section in a conviction of a person for
demonstrating on the grounds of a United States courthouse during
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1504 (2000).
156. United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
157. In re New Haven Grand Jury, 604 F. Supp. 453, 457 (D. Conn. 1985).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1506 (2000).
159. Id.
160. United States v. Kane, 433 F.2d 337, 338-39 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam).





a trial for failure to register for the draft even though the defendant
argued that the purpose of the demonstration was to get media
attention and not to interfere with the trial.'"
d. Recording, Listening to, or Observing Jury Proceedings
Title 18 also contains a section called "recording, listening to, or
observing the proceedings of a grand or petit jury while deliberating
or voting."' 65  Specifically, this section makes it an offense for
anyone "knowingly and willfully" to use any means or device to
record, or attempt to record the proceedings of any grand or petit jury
in any court in the United States while the jury is deliberating or
voting.166 It also makes it an offense to listen to, observe, or attempt
to listen to or observe the proceedings of any such jury of which the
person is not a member which the jury is deliberating or voting.167
However, this section exempts as an offense a juror's taking notes in
connection with a case for the purpose of assisting in carrying out his
or her duties as a juror. 68
e. Obstruction of Court Orders
Finally, section 1509 prohibits "obstruction of court orders" and
makes it an offense for anyone "by threats or force" to willfully
prevent, obstruct, impede, or interfere with the exercise of rights or
the performance of duties under any order, judgment, or decree of a
court of the United States. 69 The section also prohibits attempts to
do the above-stated conduct.' This offense requires proof that
actual force was used or threatened and that the defendant acted in a
manner than created a fear of death or bodily harm. 7 '
Before a person can be convicted under section 1509, he or she
must know of the court order. 72 However, a court has upheld a
conviction under the section where the defendant stated that he was
unfamiliar with the terms of the injunction. 173 In addition, the Tenth
Circuit held that necessity could not be raised in a prosecution under
section 1509 involving a person who scaled a fence surrounding a
164. United States v. Carter, 717 F.2d 1216, 1218-1220 (8th Cir. 1983).




169. Id. § 1509.
170. Id.
171. United States v. Cooley, 787 F. Supp. 977, 981 (D. Kan. 1992).
172. United States v. Griffin, 525 F.2d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1975).
173. Cooley, 787 F. Supp. at 989.
[Vol. 65
JOHN F. DECKER
women's health clinic, since other alternatives were available for
protest. 7
4
3. Obstruction of Proceedings Before Government Agencies
The third category of specific obstruction of justice offenses,
contained in section 1505, outlaws the "obstruction of proceedings
before government departments, agencies and committees."'75 This
section contains two separate offenses. First, it is a crime for anyone
with the "intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance" with
a civil investigative demand made under the Antitrust Civil Process
Act, to willfully withhold, misrepresent, remove, conceal, cover up
destroy, mutilate, alter, or falsify any document, interrogatories, or oral
testimony, which is the subject of the investigative demand.'76 There
are no reported cases dealing with this paragraph.
The second paragraph of section 1505 is much broader and has
been the basis of a number of prosecutions. This paragraph makes it
an offense for anyone "corruptly or by threats or force, or by any
threatening letter or communication" to influence, obstruct, or impede
or attempt to influence, obstruct, or impede any proceeding before a
federal department or agency or any Congressional committee.'77
Therefore, the elements of an offense under section 1505 are as
follows: (1) There must be proceedings pending before a federal
agency or department, (2) the defendant must be aware of the
proceedings, and (3) the defendant must have intentionally and
corruptly attempted to influence, obstruct or impede the proceedings.
The elements of section 1505 closely mirror those in section 1503,
except that the proceeding requirement applies to administrative, rather
than judicial, proceedings. This requirement has been interpreted
broadly to protect "any actions of an agency which relate to some
matter within the scope of the rulemaking or adjudicative power vested
in the agency by law." 8 For example, investigations by Congress,
79
the Federal Trade Commission, 8 ° and the Internal Revenue Service 8'
have met the proceeding requirement, whereas an FBI investigation' 82
was not such a proceeding.
Also like section 1503, an endeavor to obstruct justice, even if
unsuccessful, suffices for purposes of the offense. Thus, where two
174. United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1995).
175. 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2000).
176. Id. (referring to 15 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000)).
177. Id.
178. United States v. Higgins, 511 F. Supp. 453, 455 (W.D. Ky. 1981).
179. United States v. Mitchell, 877 F.2d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 1989).
180. United States v. Fruchtman, 421 F.2d 1019, 1021 (6th Cir. 1970).
181. United States v. Price, 951 F.2d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 1991).
182. Higgins, 511 F. Supp. at 455.
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nephews of a Congressional committee chairman accepted $50,000
from the target of an investigation by that committee in exchange for
a promise to halt the investigation, the nephews endeavored to
obstruct justice, even though they did not take any steps to influence
the investigation. 1
83
4. Obstruction of Government Investigations
The fourth category of obstruction of justice involves the
obstruction of government investigations. This category contains
eight separate criminal offenses.
a. Obstruction of Criminal Investigations
Section 1510 contains four offenses related to the "obstruction of
criminal investigations."' First, section 1510(a) makes it an offense
for any person to willfully endeavor to bribe in order to obstruct,
delay, or prevent the communication of information to a criminal
investigator. 8 5 Second, section 1510(b)(1) makes it an offense for an
officer of a financial institution to notify a person about a subpoena
for records of that financial institution or information that has been
furnished to a grand jury in response to that subpoena. 86 Third,
section 1510(b)(2) makes it an offense for an officer or a financial
institution to notify a customer of that financial institution whose
records are sought by a grand jury about the subpoena or information
that has been furnished to the grand jury in response to the
subpoena.' Finally, section 15 10(d) makes it an offense for anyone
who is an officer, director, agent or employee of a person engaged in
the insurance business to notify any other person about a subpoena
for the records of that person engaged or information that has been
furnished to a federal grand jury in response to that subpoena.'88
While there are no reported decisions involving sections 1510(b)
or 1510(d), section 1510(a) has been the focus of various
prosecutions. Section 1510(a) requires three crucial elements: that
the defendant (1) willfully (2) endeavor to bribe in order to obstruct,
delay or prevent the communication of information (3) to a criminal
investigator.
Although the statute specifically mentions only bribery, it has
been interpreted to prohibit all "threatening efforts designed to
183. Mitchell, 877 F.2d at 297.
184. 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (2000).
185. Id. § 1510(a)(1).
186. Id. § 1510(b)(1).
187. Id. § 1510(b)(2).
188. Id. §1510 (d).
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prevent a person from communicating information about a crime to a
federal prosecutor." '89 For instance, a conviction was upheld under
this section when a defendant threatened an informant that he would be
"blown away" if he testified against the defendant."9 Section 1510 is
not limited to pre-indictment investigations but also can apply after
judicial proceedings have commenced. 9' In addition, the
interpretation of "criminal investigator" has been interpreted broadly
to include FBI agents,192 IRS agents,'93 and employees of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. 19-
b. Tampering with a Witness, Victim, or Informant
In 1982, Congress amended the obstruction of justice omnibus
clause in section 1503 and passed the Victim and Witness Protection
Act (VWPA) to explicitly protect victims and witnesses in federal
proceedings. 195 The VWPA added several new obstruction of justice
offenses, the most important of which is section 1512, criminalizing
"tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant. 196 This section
addresses four forms of conduct, specifically (1) the killing of another
person,' 97 (2) use of force against another person, 198 (3) intimidation or
corrupt persuasion, 199 and (4) harassment of another person.200 Each of
these forms of tampering will now be discussed.
First, section 1512(a) makes it an offense for anyone to kill or
attempt to kill another person, with the intent to prevent (1) that person
from attending or testifying in an official proceeding, (2) the
production of a record, document, or other object, in an official
proceeding, or (3) the communication by any person to a law
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information
relating to the commission or possible commission of a federal offense
or a violation of conditions of probation, parole, or release pending
judicial proceedings.2°'
The second and third forms of conduct have similar statutory
language and will be discussed together. Thus, it is a crime for
189. United States v. Murray 751 F.2d 1528, 1534 (9th Cir. 1985).
190. Id. at 1535.
191. United States v. Koehler, 544 F.2d 1326, 1329 (5th Cir. 1977).
192. United States v. Segal, 649 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1981).
193. United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 1980).
194. United States v. Abrams, 543 F. Supp. 1184, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
195. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§
1512-1514, 3579 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003)).
196. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
197. Id. § 1512(a)(1).
198. Id. § 1512(a)(2).
199. Id. § 1512(b).
200. Id. § 1512(d).
201. Id. § 1512(a)(1).
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anyone to use or threaten physical force against any person,
knowingly intimidate, threaten, or corruptly persuade another person,
or engage in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent
to (1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an
official proceeding; (2) cause or induce any person to (a) withhold
testimony or a record, document, or other object, from an official
proceeding, (b) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with
intent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use in an
official proceeding, (c) evade legal process summoning that person
to appear as a witness, or to produce a record, document, or other
object, in an official proceeding, or (d) be absent from an official
proceeding to which that person has been summoned by legal
process; or (3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a
federal law enforcement officer or judge of information relating to
the commission or possible commission of a federal offense or a
violation of conditions of probation, supervised release, parole, or
release pending judicial proceedings. °2
Finally, section 1512(d) makes it a crime for anyone to
intentionally harass another person and thereby hinder, delay,
prevent, or dissuade the person from (1) attending or testifying in an
official proceeding, (2) reporting to a federal law enforcement officer
or the commission or possible commission of a federal offense or a
violation of conditions of probation, supervised release, parole, or
release pending judicial proceedings, (3) arresting or seeking the
arrest of another person in connection with a federal offense, or (4)
causing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation revocation
proceeding, to be sought or instituted, or assisting in such prosecution
or proceeding.20 3
Section 1512 also outlaws any attempt to do any of the above.2 4
However, under this section, it is an affirmative defense that the
conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant's
sole intention was to cause the other person to testify truthfully. 205
The majority of witness tampering cases involve section 1512(b),
which prohibits intimidation, threats, corrupt persuasion, and
misleading conduct. For example, where a defendant gang member
was ordered to "terminate" a government witness, and the defendant
later taunted and beat the witness, the defendant was found to have
violated section 1512(b).20 6
202. Id. § 1512(a)(2)-(b).
203. Id. § 1512(d).
204. Id. § 1512.
205. Id. § 1512(e).
206. United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 200-01 (1st Cir. 1999).
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c. Retaliation Against a Witness, Victim, or Informant
Section 1513, which is called "retaliating against a witness,
victim, or an informant," is similar to section 1512, except that it
further prohibits retaliation against a person who has already
testified or reported information to authorities.2 07  This section
declares it a crime for anyone to kill or attempt to kill another person
with the intent to retaliate against any person for (1) the attendance
of a witness or party at an official proceeding, (2) providing any
testimony given or any record, document, or other object produced
by a witness in an official proceeding, or (3) providing to a law
enforcement officer any information relating to the commission or
possible commission of a federal offense or a violation of conditions
of probation, supervised release, parole, or release pending judicial
proceedings. °8 It is also an offense for anyone knowingly to
threaten or cause bodily injury to another person or damages the
tangible property of another person, with the same intent to retaliate
against any person.2 °9
Whether a defendant's statements and conduct qualify as
"threatening" under this section is a question of fact.210  For
example, in United States v. Paradis,21 ' a defendant, following his
arrest on drug charges, began looking for an informant who provided
information to law enforcement officials. 1 2 The defendant then
warned the informant's roommate that the informant was "very well
wanted," and along with a co-defendant, barged into the apartment
of the informant's ex-girlfriend.1 3 In the apartment, the defendant
told the ex-girlfriend that "he would not harm her, but he was not
sure of the other people, and that he could not speak for her
friends. 2 4 Also while in the apartment, the co-defendant backed a
man up against the wall, pressed an object into the man's ribs, and
asked about the informant's whereabouts. 25  According to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, this evidence
was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction under section
1513.216
207. 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2000).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. United States v. Paradis, 802 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir. 1986).
211. 802 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1986).
212. Id. at 562.
213. Id. at 562-63.





d. Obstruction of a Federal Audit
Section 1516, called "obstruction of a Federal audit," makes it an
offense for anyone, with intent to deceive or defraud the United
States, to attempt to influence, obstruct, or impede a federal auditor
in the performance of official duties relating to a person, entity, or
program receiving in excess of $100,000 directly or indirectly from
the United States in any one-year period under a contract or
subcontract, grant, or cooperative agreement, or relating to any
property that is security for a mortgage note that is insured,
guaranteed, acquired or held by the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) under any enactment administered by HUD, or
relating to any property that is security for a loan that is made or
guaranteed under Title V of the Housing Act of 1949.217 The only
reported case on this section held that the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) audit did not qualify as one
"performed for or on behalf of the United States" within the meaning
of the section.21 8
e. Obstructing Examination of a Financial Institution
Section 1517, titled "obstruction of financial institution,"
prohibits anyone from corruptly obstructing or attempting to obstruct
any examination of a financial institution by an agency of the United
States with the jurisdiction to examine such a financial institution.21 9
There are no reported prosecutions under this section.
f Obstructing the Criminal Investigation of Health Care
Offenses
Section 1518 reflects a stricture called "obstruction criminal
investigations of health care offenses. 22 ° It prohibits anyone from
willfully preventing, obstructing, misleading, delaying, or attempting
to prevent, obstruct, mislead, or delay the communication of
information or records relating to a violation of a federal health care
offense to a criminal investigator.2  There are no reported
prosecutions under this section.
217. 18 U.S.C. § 1516 (2000) (referring to the Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1471).
218. United States v. Plasser American Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 140, 142 (E.D. Pa.
1999).
219. 18 U.S.C. § 1517 (2000).




g. Destruction, Alteration, or Falsification of Records of
Federal Investigations and Bankruptcy
Section 1519 outlaws the "destruction, alteration, or falsification
of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy. 2 22 It makes it
an offense for anyone knowingly to alter, destroy, mutilate, conceal,
cover up, falsify or make a false entry in any record, document or
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the
investigation of the proper administration of any bankruptcy matter
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the federal
government.223 This section was added in July 2002, and there are,
as yet, no reported prosecutions under the section.
h. Destruction of Corporate Audit Records
Section 1520 criminalizes the "destruction of corporate audit
records. 224 It requires any accountant who conducts an audit of an
issuer of securities covered by section 1OA(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to maintain all audit or review workpapers for
a period of five years from the end of the fiscal period in which the
audit or review was conducted.225 The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) must make rules and regulations relating to the
retention of such work records.2 26 Anyone who violates the
requirement to retain audit records or the SEC's regulations can be
punished. 227 This section was added in July 2002 and there are, as
yet, no reported prosecutions under the section.
5. Obstruction of Law Enforcement in Order to Facilitate
Illegal Gambling Business
Finally, section 1511 reflects the offense of "obstruction of law
enforcement officer in order to facilitate illegal gambling
business. 228  It makes it unlawful for two or more persons to
conspire to obstruct the enforcement of the criminal laws of a state or
any of its political subdivisions, with the intent to facilitate an illegal
gambling business if one or more of the persons (1) "does any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy;" (2) "is an official or employee,
elected, appointed or otherwise, of the state or its political
222. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1519 (West Supp. 2003).
223. Id.




228. Id. § 1511 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
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subdivisions;" and (3) "conducts, finances, manages, supervises,
directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business."229
Section 1511 defines the "illegal gambling business" as a
gambling business which (1) violates the law of the state or political
subdivision where it is conducted; (2) involves five or more people
who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own all or part of
the business; and (3) has been or remains in substantially continuous
operation for over thirty days or has gross revenue of $2,000 in any
day.23° "Gambling" is defined to include "pool-selling, bookmaking,
maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels, or dice tables, and
conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling
chances" on them.23' This offense cannot be applied to any bingo
game, lottery, or similar game of chance conducted by an
organization exempt from income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code if none of the gross receipts benefit a private
shareholder, member, or employee of the organization, except as
compensation for actual expenses of conducting the activity.
231
This section requires that the prosecution prove the elements of
a conspiracy, that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy, and
that the object of the conspiracy was to facilitate the illegal gambling
business. 3  At least one member of the conspiracy must be a
government official, and one member must be involved in the illegal
gambling business.234 Thus, there was a conspiracy under this section
where the defendant agreed to become a deputy sheriff in order to
provide protection for gambling operations.
IV. STATE LEGISLATION
The fifty states and the District of Columbia have taken a variety
of statutory approaches to prohibit the obstruction of justice. This
section attempts to categorize and briefly analyze these approaches.
As stated above, offenses such as perjury and bribery that have
developed into distinct and separate offenses are not included in this
study. Further, some statutes do not lend themselves to an easy
categorization. While some may disagree with the inclusion or
exclusion of a particular statute in a given category, it is important to
note that this section is intended as a broad overview of the various
types of obstruction of justice statutes. For information about a
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. § 1511(b)(2).
232. Id. § 1511(c).
233. United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1055 (5th Cir. 1981).
234. United States v. Crockett, 514 F.2d 64, 74 (5th Cir. 1975).
235. United States v. Panzanella, 416 F. Supp. 68, 71 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
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particular offense or category, readers should consult the applicable
state criminal code and case law.
This section will first address general statutes that prohibit
obstruction of justice in very broad terms. Next, obstruction of
justice statutes that prohibit obstruction in specific terms will be
discussed. Then, this article will point out some of the other
enactments that specifically outlaw various forms of obstruction.
These laws include: (1) tampering with evidence; (2) tampering with
public records; (3) tampering with jurors; (4) tampering with
witnesses, victims, and informants; (5) obstructing the judicial
process; (6) obstructing or refusing to aid law enforcement officials
and other personnel; (7) failing to file or filing false reports; and (8)
disclosing confidential information.
A. General Statute with Broad Language
Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have a general
obstruction statute with broad language.236 For instance, the
236. Alabama: Ala. Code § 13A-10-2 (1994) (obstructing governmental
operations); Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2402 (2001) (obstructing government
operations); Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-102 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002)
(obstructing governmental operations); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-102
(1999) (obstructing government operations); District of Columbia: D.C. Code Ann.
§ 22-722(a)(6) (2001 & Supp. 2003) (prohibited acts); Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. §
710-1010 (1999 & Supp. 2002) (obstructing government operations); Kentucky:
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519.020 (Michie 2003) (obstructing governmental
operations); Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 451 (West 1983) (obstructing
government administration); Maryland: Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 9-306 (2002)
(obstruction of justice); Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.478a (Supp. 2003)
(intimidation, hindering, or obstruction of public officer or employee); Mississippi:
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-9-55 (2000) (intimidating judge,juror, witness, attorney, etc.,
or otherwise obstructing justice); Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 576.030 (1995)
(obstructing government operations); Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-901
(1995) (obstructing government operations); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. 197.190
(2001) (obstructing public officer); New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:1
(1996) (obstructing government administration); New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2C:29-1 (West 1995) (obstructing administration of law or other governmental
function); New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05 (McKinney 1999) (obstructing
governmental administration in the second degree); North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code
§ 12.1-08-01 (1997) (physical obstruction of government function); Ohio: Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.31 (Anderson 2002) (obstructing official business); Oregon:
Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.235 (1999) (obstructing governmental or judicial
administration); Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5101 (1983) (obstructing
administration of law or other governmental function); Rhode Island: R.I. Gen.
Laws § 11-32-3 (2002) (obstruction of the judicial system); Utah: Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-8-301 (1999) (interference with public servant); Vermont: Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
13, § 3015 (1998) (obstruction of justice); Virginia: Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-460
(Michie 1996) (obstructing justice); Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-305 (Michie
2003) (obstructing or impeding justice).
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Arkansas code contains a crime called "obstructing governmental
operations." '237 This law states, in pertinent part: "(a) A person
commits the offense of obstructing governmental operations if the
person (1) Knowingly obstructs, impairs, or hinders the performance
of any governmental function.... ,,238 These types of statutes are
characterized both by the broad range of prohibited conduct and the
expansive range of government activities protected.
First, the prohibited conduct is typically described in very broad
language. For example, under these laws, a person commits a crime
when he "obstructs, impairs, or hinders, or in "any way obstructs
or impedes' 24O or "obstructs, impairs, or perverts"2 4-1 or "obstructs,
impairs, impedes, hinders, prevents, or perverts ' 24 2 justice.
Seventeen statutes qualify this broad language by stating the
obstruction must occur by certain "means."243 A typical example of
this is Oregon's statute, which punishes whoever obstructs justice "by
means of intimidation, force, physical or economic interference or
obstacle. '"2 " Hawaii's parallel offense similarly prohibits
obstructions "by using or threatening to use violence, force, or
237. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-102 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002).
238. Id.
239. Ala. Code § 13A-10-2 (1994) (obstructing governmental operations).
240. D.C. Code Ann. § 22-722(a)(6) (2001 & Supp. 2003) (prohibited acts).
241. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-1 (West 1995) (obstructing administration of law
or other governmental function).
242. N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-08-01 (1997) (physical obstruction of government
function).
243. Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2402 (2001) (obstructing government
operations); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-102 (1999) (obstructing government
operations); District of Columbia: D.C. Code Ann. § 22-722(a)(6) (2001 & Supp.
2003) (prohibited acts); Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1010 (1999 & Supp. 2002)
(obstructing government operations); Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519.020
(Michie 2003) (obstructing governmental operations); Maryland: Md. Code Ann.,
Crim. Law § 9-306 (2002) (obstruction of justice); Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann.
§ 97-9-55 (2000) (intimidating judge, juror, witness, attorney, etc., or otherwise
obstructing justice); Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 576.030 (1995) (obstructing
government operations); Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-901 (1995)
(obstructing government operations); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. 197.190 (2001)
(obstructing public officer); New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:1 (1996)
(obstructing government administration); New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-1
(West 1995) (obstructing administration of law or other governmental function);
New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05 (McKinney 1999) (obstructing governmental
administration in the second degree); Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.235 (1999)
(obstructing governmental or judicial administration); Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 5101 (1983) (obstructing administration of law or other governmental
function); Vermont: Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3015 (1998) (obstruction of justice);
Virginia: Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-460 (Michie 1996) (obstructingjustice); Wyoming:
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-305 (Michie 2003) (obstructing or impeding justice).




physical interference or obstacle. '2 45 The New York statute also
contains similar language, but it further prohibits obstruction "by
means of interfering ... with radio, telephone, television or other
[government-owned] telecommunications system or by means of
releasing a dangerous animal under circumstances evincing the
actor's intent that the animal obstruct government administration.2 46
In six other states, the statutes do not require the obstruction to
occur by specified means.247 In two states, the statutes allow for
particular means but do not require such proof in every case.248 For
example, Vermont's statute targets "whoever.. . corruptly or by
threats or force or by any threatening letter or communication,
obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede the due
administration of justice. ' 2 9 Thus, a person who obstructs justice
"corruptly" need not use threats or force to fulfill the elements of this
statute.
Second, these statutes are also broad in that they protect a wide
range of government activities. Whereas title 18, section 1503, the
broadest of the federal obstruction statutes, applies only to pending
judicial proceedings, many state laws apply generally to
"government operations.,,25° For example, twelve states prohibit the
obstruction of "government operations" or "government
functions., 25 ' Eight state statutes focus on the obstruction of a
245. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1010 (1999 & Supp. 2002) (obstructing government
operations).
246. N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05 (McKinney 1999) (obstructing governmental
administration in the second degree).
247. Alabama: Ala. Code § 13A-10-2 (1994) (obstructing governmental
operations); Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-102 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002)
(obstructing governmental operations); Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.478a
(Supp. 2003) (intimidation, hindering, or obstruction of public officer or employee);
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. 197.190 (2001) (obstructing public officer); North Dakota:
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-08-01 (1997) (physical obstruction of government
function); Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.31 (Anderson 2002) (obstructing
official business).
248. Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-32-3 (2002) (obstruction of the judicial
system); Vermont: Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3015 (1998) (obstruction of justice).
249. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3015 (1998).
250. See supra notes 33 to 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
pending judicial proceeding requirement.
251. Alabama: Ala. Code § 13A-10-2 (1994) (obstructing governmental
operations); Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-102 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002)
(obstructing governmental operations); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-102
(1999) (obstructing government operations); Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1010
(1999 & Supp. 2002) (obstructing government operations); Kentucky: Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 519.020 (Michie 2003) (obstructing governmental operations);
Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 576.030 (1995) (obstructing government operations);
Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-901 (1995) (obstructing government
operations); New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-1 (West 1995) (obstructing
2004]
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particular person,252 typically a "public servant '253 or a "public
officer. 254  For example, Ohio prohibits the obstruction of "the
performance by a public official of any authorized act within the
public official's official capacity. ' '255 Six of the broad obstruction
laws are limited to court proceedings.256
A final note concerns the mens rea, or mental state, requirement
for the broadly stated obstruction statutes. 257 Twelve states require
that the obstruction occur "purposefully" or "intentionally. '258 Three
states require specific intent to obstruct justice.259 Four states require
administration of law or other governmental function); New York: N.Y. Penal Law
§ 195.05 (McKinney 1999) (obstructing governmental administration in the second
degree); North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-08-01 (1997) (physical obstruction
of government function); Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.235 (1999) (obstructing
governmental or judicial administration); Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5101
(1983) (obstructing administration of law or other governmental function).
252. Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.478a (Supp. 2003) (intimidation,
hindering, or obstruction of public officer or employee); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat.
197.190 (2001) (obstructing public officer); New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 642:1 (1996) (obstructing government administration); New Jersey: N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2C:29-1 (West 1995) (obstructing administration of law or other
governmental function); New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05 (McKinney 1999)
(obstructing governmental administration in the second degree); Ohio: Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2921.31 (Anderson 2002) (obstructing official business); Vermont: Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3015 (1998) (obstruction of justice); Virginia: Va. Code Ann.
§ 18.2-460 (Michie 1996) (obstructing justice).
253. See e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:1 (1996) (obstructing government
administration).
254. See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. 197.190 (2001) (obstructing public officer).
255. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.31 (Anderson 2002) (obstructing official
business).
256. District of Columbia: D.C. Code Ann. § 22-722(a)(6) (2001 & Supp. 2003);
Maryland: Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 9-306 (2002); Michigan: Mich. Comp.
Laws § 750.478a (Supp. 2003); Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-32-3 (2002);
Vermont: Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3015 (1998); Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-
305 (Michie 2003).
257. For a discussion of mens rea generally, see Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W.
Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.4 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 2003).
258. Alabama: Ala. Code § 13A-10-2 (1994); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-
102 (1999); Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1010 (1999 & Supp. 2002); Kentucky:
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519.020 (Michie 2003); Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 576.030
(1995); Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-901 (1995); New Hampshire: N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:1 (1996); New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05 (McKinney
1999); North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-08-01 (1997); Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 162.235 (1999); Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5101 (1983); Utah: Utah Code
Ann. §76-8-301 (1999).
259. New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:1 (1996); Ohio: Ohio Rev.




a mental state of knowledge or willfulness. 6 ° Three states describe
the mental state using language such as "corruptly,i26' "corruptly,
maliciously, [or] recklessly,",2" and "corrupt means., 263 Finally, in
three states, the general obstruction offense is couched in terms of an
"attempt" to obstruct justice,2 6 presumably signaling specific
intent. 65
B. General Obstruction of Justice Statute Targeting Specific
Conduct
While about half of the states have codified a broad obstruction
ofjustice law, seven states have general obstruction ofjustice statutes
that prohibit specific forms of conduct.266 These statutes list a series
of specific acts that are generally considered an obstruction of justice.
For example, in Illinois, there is a statute entitled "obstructing
justice," which prohibits three acts: (1) destroying, altering,
concealing, or disguising physical evidence, planting false evidence,
or furnishing false information; (2) inducing a witness with material
knowledge to leave the state or conceal himself; and (3) leaving the
state or concealing one's self while possessing material knowledge.267
Similarly, Louisiana's obstruction statute outlaws three specific
forms of conduct.268 Briefly, these forms of conduct are: (1) evidence
tampering, (2) using or threatening force with the intent to obstruct
by one of five listed means, and (3) retaliating against a witness,
victim, juror, judge, party, attorney, or informant.
260. Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-102 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002);
District of Columbia: D.C. Code Ann. § 22-722(a)(6) (2001 & Supp. 2003);
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. 197.190 (2001); Virginia: Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-460
(Michie 1996).
261. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3015 (1998).
262. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-32-3 (2002).
263. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 9-306 (2002).
264. Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.478a (Supp. 2003); Mississippi: Miss.
Code Ann. § 97-9-55 (2000); Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-305 (Michie 2003).
265. Specific intent is generally understood to mean "some intent in addition to
the intent to do the physical act that the crime requires." LaFave & Scott, supra
note 257, § 4.10(a) (2d ed. 1986).
266. Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 11.56.510 (Michie 2002) (interference with official
proceedings); District of Columbia: D.C. Code Ann. § 22-722 (2001 & Supp. 2003)
(prohibited acts); Illinois: 720 I11. Comp. Stat. 5/31-4 (2002) (obstruction of
justice); Indiana: Ind. Code § 35-44-3-4 (1998) (tampering-obstruction ofjustice);
Iowa: Iowa Code § 719.3 (1993) (preventing apprehension, obstructing prosecution,
or obstructing defense); Louisiana: La. R.S. § 14:130.1 (2003) (obstruction of
justice); Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.483a (Supp. 2003) (production of
evidence, withholding or refusal to produce).
267. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/31-4 (2002).




Among the seven states in this category are two
jurisdictions-the District of Columbia and Michigan-that have a
broad obstruction law in addition to the specific statute. For instance,
under the District of Columbia's "obstruction of justice" provision,
a person commits obstruction if he "[c]orruptly, or by threats of
force, any way obstructs or impedes or endeavors to obstruct or
impede the due administration of justice in any official
proceeding."27  Thus, the District of Columbia's criminal code
contains a broadly-stated obstruction statute similar to the federal
omnibus clause."' In addition, the same statute delineates five
specific offenses that constitute an obstruction.272 These offenses are
(1) jury tampering; 273 (2) witness tampering; 274 (3) harassment with
intent to hinder a person's testimony, report to law enforcement,
arrest, or criminal prosecution; 75 (4) retaliation against a witness; 276
and (5) retaliation against a juror.2 77
C. Other "Obstructions"
In a few states, there is a crime called obstructing justice, but that
crime departs from the traditional understanding of this offense.
First, three states-Montana,2 78 Ohio,27 9 and Utah -have a crime
called obstructing justice that is equivalent to what many states
punish through accomplice liability or an offense called "hindering
prosecution." For instance, in Ohio, a person obstructs justice,
when, intending to hinder the prosecution or apprehension of a
person who has committed a crime, he (1) harbors or conceals that
person, (2) provides or aids that person with means to avoid
discovery or apprehension, (3) warns that person of impending
270. D.C. Code Ann. § 22-722(a)(6) (2001 & Supp. 2003).
271. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000).
272. D.C. Code Ann. § 22-722 (2001 & Supp. 2003).
273. Id. § 22-722(a)(1).
274. Id. § 22-722(a)(2).
275. Id. § 22-722(a)(3).
276. Id. § 22-722(a)(4).
277. Id. § 22-722(a)(5).
278. See Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-303 (2001) (obstructing justice).
279. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.32 (Anderson 2002) (obstructingjustice).
280. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (1999 & Supp. 2002) (obstruction of
justice).
281. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 575.030 (1995) (prohibiting persons, with the
purpose of preventing the apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of
another, from (1) harboring or concealing another person, (2) warning a person of
impending discovery or apprehension, (3) providing a person with means to aid him
in avoiding discovery and apprehension, or (4) preventing a person from
performing an act that might aid in the discovery or apprehension of another
person).
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discovery or apprehension, (4) tampers with evidence that might aid
in the discovery or apprehension of that person, (5) provides false
information, or (6) obstructs another from performing an act which
might aid in the discovery or apprehension of that person.282
Secondly, Hawaii's crime called "obstruction of justice" refers only
to the refusal to testify after being granted immunity. 83 Finally,
Wisconsin's statute titled "obstructing justice" prohibits only the
giving of false information to a court officer.284
D. Specific Offenses Relating to the Obstruction of Justice
Next, this section will explore some of the categories of
obstructionist conduct that many states have separately codified.
Even states that prohibit the obstruction ofjustice in broad or specific
terms often have a number of these individual statutes. As stated
above, offenses such as perjury, bribery, destruction of government
property, contempt, and escape are omitted from this discussion.
1. Tampering with Evidence
The first category of specific obstruction offenses contains crimes
that involve the tampering with evidence. Thirty-two states have a
statute that prohibits, in some form, the concealment, destruction, or
tampering with evidence. 285  Alaska's statute, "tampering with
282. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.32 (Anderson 2002) (obstructing justice).
283. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1072.5 (1999).
284. Wis. Stat. § 946.65 (1996 & Supp. 2002).
285. Alabama: Ala. Code § 13A-10-129 (1994) (tampering with physical
evidence); Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 11.56.610 (2002) (tampering with physical
evidence); Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2809 (2001) (tampering with physical
evidence); Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-53-111 (Michie 1997) (tampering with
physical evidence); California: Cal. Penal Code § 132 (West 1999) (offering forged,
altered, or ante-dated book, document, or record); id. § 134 (preparing false
documentary evidence); id. § 135 (destroying or concealing documentary
evidence); id. § 135.5 (evidence tampering in disciplinary proceeding against public
safety officer); id. § 141 (Supp. 2003) (intentional alteration of physical matter with
intent to charge person with a crime); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-610 (1999)
(tampering with physical evidence); Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a- 155
(West 2001) (tampering with or fabricating physical evidence); Delaware: Del.
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1269 (2001) (tampering with physical evidence); District of
Columbia: D.C. Code Ann. § 22-723 (2001) (tampering with physical evidence);
Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 16-10-94 (1999 & Supp. 2002) (tampering with
evidence); Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1076 (1999) (tampering with physical
evidence); Idaho: Idaho Code § 18-2601 (Michie 1997) (falsifying evidence); id.
§ 18-2602 (preparing false evidence); id. § 18-2603 (destruction, alteration or
concealment of evidence); Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 524.100 (Michie 1999)
(tampering with physical evidence); id. § 524.140 (Michie Supp. 2002) (disposal
of evidence that may be subject to DNA testing); Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
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physical evidence," is illustrative of the various forms of conduct
outlawed by these statutes.286 In that state, a person tampers with
evidence when he (1) "destroys, mutilates, alters, suppresses,
conceals, or removes" the evidence; (2) "makes, presents, or uses
physical evidence, knowing it to be false," to mislead a juror or a
public servant; or (3) "prevents the production of physical evidence"
in a proceeding or investigation.287
The North Carolina code, however, also contains a more pointed
provision titled "altering, destroying, or stealing evidence of criminal
conduct. 2 88 A person commits this offense if he "breaks or enters
any building, structure, compartment, vehicle, file, cabinet, drawer,
or any other enclosure wherein evidence relevant to any criminal
offense or court proceeding is kept or stored with the purpose of
alerting, destroying or stealing such evidence., 289
Many of these evidence tampering statutes contain a broad
definition of "evidence." For example, in Colorado, "evidence"
includes "any article, object, document, record, or other thing of
physical substance. 290 Instead of defining the term, many other laws
simply refer to "physical evidence" 291 or "any thing.,
292
17, § 455 (West 1983) (falsifying physical evidence); Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. §
575.100 (1995) (tampering with physical evidence); Montana: Mont. Code Ann.
§ 45-7-207 (2001) (tampering with or fabricating physical evidence); Nebraska:
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-922 (1995) (tampering with physical evidence); Nevada: Nev.
Rev. Stat. 199.210 (2001) (offering false evidence); id. 199.220 (destroying
evidence); New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 641:6 (1996) (falsifying
physical evidence); New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:28-6 (West 1995) (tampering
with or fabricating physical evidence); New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-5
(Michie 2001) (tampering with evidence); New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 215.40
(McKinney 2001) (tampering with physical evidence); North Carolina: N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-221.1 (2002) (altering, destroying, or stealing evidence of criminal
conduct); North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-09-03 (1997) (tampering with
physical evidence); Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.12 (Anderson 2003)
(tampering with evidence); Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 451 (2003) (offering
false evidence); id. § 453 (preparing false evidence); id. § 454 (destroying
evidence); Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.295 (1999) (tampering with physical
evidence); Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4910 (1983) (tampering with or
fabricating physical evidence); South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 22-11-21
(Michie 1998) (offer of forged or fraudulent evidence); id. § 22-11-22 (falsification
of evidence); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-503 (1997) (tampering with or
fabricating evidence); Texas: Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.09 (Vernon 2003)
(tampering with or fabricating evidence); Washington: Wash. Rev. Code §
9A.72.150 (2000) (tampering with physical evidence).
286. Alaska Stat. § 11.56.610(a)(1) (2002).
287. Id.
288. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-221.1 (2002).
289. Id.
290. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-610 (1999).
291. Alaska Stat. § 11.56.610 (2002).
292. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 641:6 (1996).
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Tampering with evidence is usually a specific intent crime.293 In
other words, the evidence tampering must occur, as in the New York
statute, "with intent that [the evidence] be used or introduced in an
official proceeding or a prospective official proceeding" or
"intending to prevent such production. ,294 Besides the specific intent
required, many laws, such as New Hampshire's, further require that
the offender "believ[e] that an official proceeding ... or investigation
is pending or about to be instituted. 2 1
While most of these states have a single evidence tampering
section, some have divided the tampering into several distinct
offenses. For instance, Oklahoma's criminal code contains separate
offenses for "offering false evidence, '"296 "preparing false
evidence,297 which are both felonies, and "destroying evidence, ' '298
a misdemeanor offense. Also, in California, there are at least five
offenses that criminalize some form of evidence tampering.299 Other
states also prohibit tampering with particular types of evidence, such
as evidence that may be subject to DNA testing.3°°
2. Tampering with Public Records
A somewhat related category of offenses is tampering with public
records, a crime outlawed by thirty-five states.3°  Statutes
293. For more information on specific intent, see supra notes 78 and 265.
294. N.Y. Penal Law § 215.40 (McKinney 2001).
295. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 641:6 (1996).
296. Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 451 (2003).
297. Id. § 453.
298. Id. § 454.
299. Cal. Penal Code § 132 (West 1999) (offering forged, altered, or ante-dated
book, document, or record); id. § 134 (preparing false documentary evidence); id.
§ 135 (destroying or concealing documentary evidence); id. § 135.5 (evidence
tampering in disciplinary proceeding against public safety officer); id. § 141 (Supp.
2003) (intentional alteration of physical matter with intent to charge person with a
crime).
300. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 524.140 (Michie Supp. 2002) (disposal of evidence
that may be subject to DNA testing).
301. Alabama: Ala. Code § 13A-10-12 (1994) (tampering with governmental
records); Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 11.56.815 (2002) (tampering with public records
in the first degree); id. § 11.56.820 (tampering with public records in the second
degree); Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2407 (2001) (tampering with a public
record); Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-121 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002)
(tampering with a public record); California: Cal. Penal Code § 115 (West 1999)
(procuring or offering false or forged instruments for record); id. § 115.3 (altered
certified copy of official record); id. § 115.5 (filing false or forged documents
relating to single-family residences); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-114 (1999)
(abuse of public records); Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-153 (2001) (unlawful
removal or alteration of records); Florida: Fla. Stat. ch. 839.13 (2000 & Supp. 2003)
(falsifying records); Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1017 (1999) (tampering with
2004]
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in this category are similar to those banning evidence tampering
except that these protect government documents. For instance, North
Dakota's statute, "tampering with public records," makes it a crime
if someone "(a) knowingly makes a false entry in or false alteration
of a government record; or (b) knowingly, without lawful authority,
destroys, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the verity or
availability of a government record. '3 2
Those states that define government records often do so broadly.
For example, Hawaii's statute protects "anything belonging to,
a government record); Idaho: Idaho Code § 18-3201 (1997) (officer stealing,
mutilating or falsifying public records); id. § 18-3202 (private person stealing,
mutilating or falsifying public records); id. § 18-3203 (offering false or forged
instrument for record); Illinois: 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/32-8 (2002) (tampering with
public records); id. 5/32-8 (tampering with public notice); Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. §
21-3821 (1995) (tampering with a public record); id. § 21-3822 (tampering with
public notice); Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519.060 (Michie 1999) (tampering
with public records); Louisiana: La. R.S. § 14:132 (2003) (injuring public records);
id. § 14:133 (filing or maintaining false public records); Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 17, § 456 (1983) (tampering with public records or information); Michigan: Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.491 (1991) (removal, mutilation or destruction of public records);
Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. § 97-9-3 (2000) (court records and public papers;
stealing, concealing, destroying, etc.); Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 575.110 (1995)
(tampering with a public record); Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-208 (2001)
(tampering with public records or information); Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-909
(1995) (falsifying records of a public utility); id. § 28-911 (abuse of public records);
New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 641.7 (1996) (tampering with public records
or information); New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C: 28-7 (West 1995) (tampering with
public records or information); New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-26-1 (Michie
2001) (tampering with public records); North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-241
(2002) (disposing of public documents or refusing to deliver them over to successor);
North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-11-05 (1997) (tampering with public records);
Oklahoma: Okla Stat. tit. 21, § 461 (2002) (larceny or destruction of records by clerk
or officer); id. § 462 (larceny or destruction of records by other persons); id. § 463
(offering forged or false instruments for record); id. § 531 (destruction or falsification
of records); Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.305 (1999) (tampering with public records);
Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4911 (1983) (tampering with public records or
information); South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 22-11-23 (Michie 1998)
(falsification of public records); id. § 22-11-23.1 (offering false instrument for
recording); id. § 22-11-24 (destruction or impairment of public record); id. § 22-11-25
(unlawful retention of public record); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-504
(1997) (destruction of and tampering with governmental records); Texas: Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 37.10 (Vernon 2003) (tampering with governmental record); Utah: Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-511 (1999) (falsification or alteration of government record); id. §
76-8-412 (stealing, destroying or mutilating public records by custodian); id. § 76-8-
413 (stealing, destroying or mutilating public records by one not custodian); id. § 76-
8414 (recording false or forged instruments); Virginia: Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-472
(Michie 1996) (false entries or destruction of records by officers); West Virginia: W.
Va. Code § 61-5-22 (2000) (alteration, concealment or destruction of public record
by officer); Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 946.72 (1996 & Supp. 2002) (tampering with
public records and notices).
302. N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-11-05 (1997) (tampering with public records).
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received, or kept by the government for information or record, or
required by law to be kept for information of the government."303
3. Tampering with Jurors
Thus far, the specific obstruction offenses have related to
evidence, documents, and other "things." However, the next three
categories involve the obstruction of certain people, beginning with
jurors.
While jury tampering is sometimes addressed through states'
bribery statutes,3° thirty one states have created laws that prohibit
other forms of jury tampering. °5 Some of these laws, such as
303. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1017 (1999) (tampering with a government record).
304. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 9-202 (2002) (prohibiting both
accepting bribes by jurors and bribing jurors by others).
305. Alabama: Ala. Code § 13A-10-127 (1994) (intimidating ajuror); id. § 13A-
10-128 (jury tampering); Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 11.56.590 (2002) (jury tampering);
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2805 (2001) (influencing ajuror); id. § 13-2807 (jury
tampering); Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-53-114 (Michie 1997) (intimidating a
juror); id. § 5-53-115 (jury tampering); id. § 5-53-132 (misconduct in selecting or
summoning jurors); id. § 5-53-133 (approaching jury commissioners to influence
jury selections); California: Cal. Penal Code § 116 (West 1997) (tampering with
jury list); id. § 116.5 (jury tampering); id. § 117 (falsification of jury list).
Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-608 (1999) (intimidating ajuror); id. § 18-8-609
(jury-tampering); id. § 18-8-706.5 (retaliation against a juror); Connecticut: Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-154 (West 2001) (tampering with a juror); Delaware: Del.
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1266 (2001) (tampering with ajuror); Georgia: Ga. Code Ann.
§ 16-10-97 (1999) (intimidation or injury of grand or petit juror or court officer);
Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1074 (1999) (intimidating a juror); id. § 710-1075
(jury tampering); id. § 710-1075.5 (retaliating against a juror); Idaho: Idaho Code
§ 18-1304 (1997) (attempt to influence jurors and arbitrators); id. § 18-4404
(tampering with jury lists); Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 524.090 (Michie 1999
& Supp. 2002) (jury tampering); Louisiana: La. R.S. § 14:129 (2003) (jury
tampering); Maryland: Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 9-305 (2002) (intimidating or
corrupting juror); Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 13 (2002) (corrupting
or attempting to corrupt masters, auditors, jurors, arbitrators, umpires, or referees);
Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 575.310 (1995) (misconduct in selecting or summoning
ajuror); Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-919 (1995) (jury tampering); Nevada: Nev.
Rev. Stat. 199.040 (2001) (influencing juror, arbitrator, referee or prospective
juror), id. 199.050 (juror, arbitrator, or referee promising verdict or decision or
receiving communication); id. 199.060 (misconduct of officer drawing jury); id.
199.080 (misconduct of officer in charge of jury); New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2C:29-8 (West 1995) (corrupting or influencing ajury); New York: N.Y. Penal Law
§ 215.23 (McKinney 2001) (tampering with a juror in the second degree); id. §
215.25 (tampering with a juror in the first degree); North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-225.2 (2002) (harassment of and communication with jurors); North Dakota:
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-09-04 (1997 & Supp. 2001) (harassment of and
communication with jurors); Oklahoma: Ok. Stat. tit. 21, § 388 (2002) (attempts to
influence jurors); id. § 389 (drawing jurors fraudulently); South Carolina: S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-9-260 (Law. Co-op. 2003) (corrupting jurors, arbitrators, umpires
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Nebraska's, can be stated briefly: "A person commits the offense of
jury tampering if, with intent to influence a juror's vote, opinion,
decision, or other action in a case, attempts directly or indirectly to
communicate with a juror other than as a part of the proceedings in
the trial of the case.""°6 As this statute indicates, jury tampering is
generally a specific intent offense, with this offense requiring intent
to "influence a juror's vote, opinion, decision, or other action in a
case."
307
Unlike Nebraska, other states address jury tampering through
multiple statutes. For example, New York has provisions prohibiting
tampering with a juror in the first and second degrees. 3°' The first
degree tampering statute prohibits unlawful communications with
jurors and closely parallels the Nebraska statute cited above.30 9
Meanwhile, tampering in the second degree occurs when a person (1)
confers, (2) offers or agrees to confer, or (3) accepts or agrees to
accept benefits upon a juror in consideration for information in
relation to an action in front of a juror.310
Some states also contain crimes outlawing more egregious forms
of jury tampering, such as intimidation, threats, harassment, and
retaliation. For instance, Hawaii's criminal code contains three
distinct jury tampering crimes. 311 First, the "jury tampering" statute,
like the New York and Nebraska statutes, prohibits communicating
with a juror with intent to influence his actions as a juror.31 2 A
or referees); id. § 16-9-350 (attempting to influence juror by written or oral
communication); South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 22-11-15.3 (Michie 1998)
(threatening juror or juror's family); id. § 22-11-16 (attempt to influence jurors,
arbitrators or referees); id § 22-11-17 (jurors and-judicial officers receiving
unlawful communications); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-508 (1997)
(coercion ofjuror); id. § 39-16-509 (improper influence ofjuror); Utah: Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-508.5 (1999) (tampering with a juror-retaliation against juror);
Virginia: Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-465 (Michie 1996) (officer summoning juror to act
impartially); id. § 18.2.-466 (corruptly procuring juror to be summoned); id. § 18.2-
467 (fraud in drawing jurors, etc.); Washington: Wash. Rev. Code § 9.51.010
(2003) (misconduct of officer drawing jury); id. § 9A.72.130 (2000) (intimidating
a juror); id. § 9A.72.140 (jury tampering); West Virginia: W. Va. Code § 61-5-24
(2000) (corrupt summoning of jurors to find biased verdict); id. § 61-5-25
(procuring the summoning of biased juror by party other than officer); Wisconsin:
Wis. Stat. § 946.64 (1996 & Supp. 2002) (communicating with jurors).
306. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-919 (1995) (jury tampering).
307. Id.
308. N.Y. Penal Law § 215.23 (McKinney 2001) (tampering with a juror in the
second degree); id. § 215.25 (tampering with a juror in the first degree).
309. N.Y. Penal Law § 215.25 (McKinney 2001). For the Nebraska statute, see
supra note 306.
310. N.Y. Penal Law § 215.23 (McKinney 2001).
311. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1074 (1999) (intimidating a juror); id. § 710-1075
(jury tampering); id. § 710-1075.5 (retaliating against a juror).
312. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1075 (1999).
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second offense, called "intimidating a juror," outlaws using force or
threats with intent to influence ajuror's actions.313 Finally, Hawaii's
crime entitled "retaliating against a juror" prohibits using force or
threats against a juror because of that juror's acts in a criminal
proceeding.3 14
In addition to jury tampering laws applicable to the general
public, many states also have laws that focus on officers involved in
the jury selection process. For instance, West Virginia prohibits
sheriffs or other officers from summoning a juror "with intent that
such juror shall find a verdict for or against any party to an action, or
shall be biased in his conduct as juror."'315 A similar, but more
detailed offense is Nevada's provision outlawing "misconduct of
officer drawing jury."3 16 A person is guilty of this offense if he,
being charged with preparing a jury list, for example, places a name
in a list at the request of another, omits a name that was properly
drawn, or certifies a list that was not properly drawn.317
It is also interesting to note that a few of these jury tampering
statutes provide protection outside of criminal proceedings. For
instance, some of these laws protect the juror's family members 318
and prohibit the obstruction of persons such as arbitrators, umpires,
and referees.319
4. Tampering with Witnesses, Informants, Victims, and
Families
Like jury tampering, many states have also outlawed tampering
with witnesses, usually in a similar fashion. In fact, nine states
address both witness tampering and jury tampering within in a single
statute. 320  For example, Massachusetts law penalizes whoever
313. Id. § 710-1074 (1999).
314. Id. § 710-1075.5 (1999).
315. W. Va. Code § 61-5-24 (2000) (corrupt summoning ofjurors to find biased
verdict).
316. Nev. Rev. Stat. 199.060 (2001) (misconduct of officer drawing jury)
317. Id.
318. See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws § 22-11-15.3 (Michie 1998) (threatening
juror or juror's family).
319. See, e.g. Nev. Rev. Stat. 199.040 (2001) (influencing juror, arbitrator,
referee or prospective juror), id. 199.050 (juror, arbitrator, or referee promising
verdict or decision or receiving communication); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-260 (Law.
Co-op. 2003) (corrupting jurors, arbitrators, umpires or referees); S.D. Codified
Laws § 22-11-16 (Michie 1998) (attempt to influence jurors, arbitrators, or
referees).
320. Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-53-112 (Michie 1997) (retaliation against
a witness, informant, or juror); Illinois: 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/32-4 (2002)
(communicating with jurors and witnesses); Iowa: Iowa Code § 720.4 (1993)
(tampering with witnesses or jurors); Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 454
2004]
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"willfully endeavors ...to influence, impede, obstruct, delay or
otherwise interfere with any witness or juror.., or with any person
furnishing information to a criminal investigator ....
In thirty-six states, however, witness tampering is a distinct
offense.322 Many of these witness tampering offenses protect not
(West 1983 & Supp. 2002) (tampering with a witness, informant, juror, or victim);
Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 13B (2002) (intimidation of witnesses,
jurors, and persons furnishing information in connection with criminal
proceedings); Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. § 97-9-55 (2001) (intimidating judge,
juror, witness, attorney, etc., or otherwise obstructing justice); South Carolina: S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-9-340 (Law Co-op. 2003) (intimidation of court officials, jurors,
or witnesses); West Virginia: W. Va. Code § 61-5-27 (2000) (intimidation of and
retaliation against public officers and employees,jurors, and witnesses); Wyoming:
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-305 (Michie 2003) (influencing, intimidating, or impeding
jurors, witnesses, and officers).
321. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 13B (2002) (intimidation of witnesses, jurors,
and persons furnishing information in connection with criminal proceedings).
322. Alabama: Ala. Code § 13A-10-123 (1994) (intimidating a witness); id. §
13A-10-124 (tampering with a witness); Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 11.56.540 (2002)
(tampering with a witness in the first degree); id. § 11.56.545 (tampering with a
witness in the second degree); Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2802 (2001)
(influencing a witness); id. § 13-2804 (tampering with a witness); Arkansas: Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-53-109 (Michie 1997) (intimidating a witness); id. § 5-53-110
(tampering); California: Cal. Penal Code § 133 (Deering 1999) (deceiving witness
to affect testimony); id. § 136.1 (intimidation of witnesses and victims); id. § 136.2
(good cause belief of harm to, intimidation of, or dissuasion of victim or witness);
id. § 136.7 (sexual offender revealing name and address of witness or victim with
intent that another prisoner initiate harassing correspondence); id. § 139
(threatening to use force or violence upon witnesses or victims, or the immediate
families); id. § 140 (threatening witnesses, victims, or informants); Colorado: Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 18-8-704 (1999) (intimidating a witness or victim); id. § 18-8-705
(aggravated intimidation of a witness or victim); id. § 18-8-706 (retaliation against
a witness or victim); id. § 18-8-707 (tampering with a witness or victim);
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-151 (1999) (tampering with a witness); id. §
53a-151 a (intimidating a witness); Delaware: Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1263(2001)
(tampering with a witness); id. § 1263A (interfering with child witness); Georgia:
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-10-32 (1999) (attempted murder or threatening of witnesses
in official proceedings); id. § 16-10-93 (influencing witnesses); Hawaii: Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 710.1071 (1999) (intimidating a witness); id. § 710-1072 (tampering with
a witness); id. § 710.1072.2 (retaliating against a witness); Illinois: 720 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 5/32-4a (2002) (harassment of representatives for the child, jurors, witnesses,
and family members of representatives for the child, jurors, and witnesses); Kansas:
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3832 (1995) (intimidation of a witness or victim); id. § 21-
3833 (aggravated intimidation of a witness or victim); Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 524.050 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2002) (tampering with a witness); Louisiana:
La. R.S. § 14:129.1 (2003) (intimidating, impeding, or injuring witnesses);
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. § 609.498 (2003) (tampering with a witness); Missouri: Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 575.270 (1995 & Supp. 2003) (tampering with a witness-tampering
with a victim); Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-206 (2001) (tampering with
witnesses and informants); Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-919 (1995) (tampering
with witness or informant); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. 199.230 (2001) (preventing or
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only witnesses, but also informants and victims. Nebraska's offense,
"tampering with witness or informant," is typical of many witness
tampering statutes.323 This offense prohibits attempting to cause a
witness or informant to "(a) testify or inform falsely; (b) withhold
any testimony, information, document, or thing; (c) elude legal
process summoning him or her to testify or supply evidence; or (d)
absent himself or herself from any proceeding or investigation to
which he or she has been legally summoned."3"4 The statute further
requires that the offender believe that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending or about to be executed.325
An example of a statute that also criminalizes tampering with
victims is the Rhode Island statute called "intimidation of witnesses
and victims of crimes. 3 26 A person is guilty of this offense if, by
dissuading person from testifying or producing evidence); id. 199.240 (bribing or
intimidating witness to influence testimony); id. 199.305 (Supp. 2001) (preventing
or dissuading victim, person acting on behalf of victim, or witness from reporting
crime, commencing prosecution or causing arrest); New Hampshire: N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 641:5 (2001) (tampering with witnesses and informants); New Jersey:
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:28-5 (1995) (tampering with witnesses and informants;
retaliation against them); New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-24-3 (Michie 2001 &
Supp. 2001) (bribery or intimidation of a witness; retaliation against a witness);
New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 215.10 (McKinney 2001) (tampering with a witness
in the fourth degree); id. § 215.11 (tampering with a witness in the third degree);
id. § 215.12 (tampering with a witness in the second degree); id. § 215.13
(tampering with a witness in the first degree); id. § 215.15 (intimidating a victim
or witness in the third degree); id. § 215.16 (intimidating a victim or witness in the
second degree); id. § 215.17 (intimidating a victim or witness in the first degree);
North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-226 (2002) (intimidating or interfering with
witnesses); North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-09-01 (1997) (tampering with
witnesses and informants in proceedings); id. § 12.1-09-02 (tampering with
informants in criminal investigations); Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.04
(Anderson 2002) (intimidation of attorney, victim or witness in criminal case);
Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 452 (2002) (deceiving witness); id. § 455
(preventing witness from giving testimony-threatening witness who has given
testimony); Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.285 (1999) (tampering with a witness);
Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4952 (1983 & Supp. 2003) (intimidation of
witnesses or victims); id. § 4953 (retaliation against witness, victim or party);
Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-32-5 (2002) (intimidation of witnesses and
victims of crimes); South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 22-11-19 (Michie 1998)
(tampering with a witness); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-507 (1997)
(coercion of witness); Texas: Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 36.05 (Vernon 2003)
(tampering with witness); id. § 38.111 (improper contact with victim); Utah: Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1999 & Supp. 2002) (tampering with witness-retaliation
against witness or informant); Washington: Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.72.110 (2000)
(intimidating a witness); id. § 9A.72.120 (tampering with a witness).
323. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-919 (1995) (tampering with witness or informant).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-32-5 (2002) (intimidation of witnesses and victims of
crimes).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
threatening to commit an unlawful act, he "maliciously and
knowingly communicates with another person with the specific intent
to intimidate a victim of a crime or a witness in any criminal
proceeding with respect to that person's participation in any criminal
proceeding."327
A small number of states also have offenses that target victim
tampering alone.328 In addition, some state laws prohibit tampering
with the family members or representatives of witnesses or victims.
329
As with jury tampering statutes, many witness tampering statutes
have special provisions outlawing retaliation, intimidation, and other
severe forms of tampering. For example, within Delaware's
"tampering with a witness" law, there is a provision that prohibits
intentionally causing physical injury or damaging the property of any
party or witness "on account of past, present or future attendance at
any court proceeding or official proceeding" or "on account of past,
present, or future testimony in any action pending therein.
330
5. Obstructing Law Enforcement or Other Emergency
Personnel
Besides jurors and witnesses, many states also protect law
enforcement officials and other emergency personnel. The
overwhelming majority of states have at least one offense in this
category.
First, at least thirty states have created an offense that prohibits
a person from obstructing, resisting, or interfering with law
enforcement officers.3 These offenses are generally broadly stated,
327. Id.
328. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 136.7 (Deering 1999) (sexual offender
revealing name and address of witness or victim with intent that another prisoner
initiate harassing correspondence); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.111 (Vernon 2003)
(improper contact with victim).
329. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 139 (Deering 1999) (threatening to use force
or violence upon witnesses or victims, or the immediate families); 720 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 5/32-4a (2002) (harassment of representatives for the child, jurors, witnesses
and family members of representatives for the child, jurors, and witnesses); Nev.
Rev. Stat. 199.305 (Supp. 2001) (preventing or dissuading victim, person acting on
behalf of victim, or witness from reporting crime, commencing prosecution or
causing arrest).
330. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1263 (2001) (tampering with a witness).
331. Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2409 (2001) (obstructing criminal
investigations or prosecutions); id. 13-2410 (obstructing public officer from
collecting public money); Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-104 (Michie 1997)
(interference with a law enforcement officer); id. § 5-54-132 (Supp. 2002)
(projecting a laser light on a law enforcement officer); California: Cal. Penal Code
§ 148.10 (Supp. 2003) (resisting peace officer resulting in death or serious bodily
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as evidenced by North Carolina's crime called "resisting officers. 332
A person commits this crime if he "willfully and unlawfully resist,
delay, or obstruct a public officer in discharging or attempting to
discharge a duty of his office. 333 Similarly, in Montana, the crime
of "obstructing a peace officer or public servant" is committed if a
person "knowingly obstructs, impairs, or hinders the enforcement of
the criminal law, the preservation of the peace, or the performance of
a governmental function, including service of process.
injury to peace officer); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-104 (1999) (obstructing
a peace officer, fire fighter, emergency medical services provider, rescue specialist,
or volunteer); Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-167a (West 2001)
(interfering with an officer); Florida: Fla. Stat. ch. 843.01 (2000) (resisting officer
with violence to his or her person); id. ch. 843.02 (resisting officer without violence
to his or her person); id. ch. 843.025 (depriving officer of means of protection or
communication); Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 16-10-24 (1999) (obstructing or
hindering law enforcement officers); Illinois: 720 11. Comp. Stat. 5/31-1 (2002)
(resisting or obstructing a peace officer or correctional institution employee);
Indiana: Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3 (1998) (resisting law enforcement); Iowa: Iowa
Code § 719.1 (1993 & Supp. 2002) (interference with official acts); Louisiana: La.
R.S. § 14:108 (2003) (resisting an officer); Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
268, § 32 (2000) (interference or tampering with police or fire signal systems or
motorist highways emergency aid call boxes); Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws §
750.479 (1991) (resisting, obstructing officer in discharge of duty); Montana: Mont.
Code Ann. § 45-7-302 (2001) (obstructing peace officer or other public servant);
id. § 45-7-304 (failure to aid a peace officer); Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-906
(1995) (obstructing a peace officer); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. 197.090 (2001)
(interfering with public officer); id. 197.100 (influencing public officer); id.
197.190 (obstructing public officer); id. 199.280 (resisting public officer); New
Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-1 (Michie 2001) (resisting, evading or obstructing
an officer); North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223 (2002) (resisting officers);
North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-08-02 (1997) (preventing arrest or discharge
of other duties); Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 540 (2002) (obstructing
officer); id. § 540A (eluding police officer); id. § 545 (attempt to intimidate
officer); Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.247 (1999) (interfering with a peace officer);
Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5104 (1983) (resisting arrest or other law
enforcement); Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-32-1 (2002) (obstructing officer
in execution of duty); South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 22-11-2 (Michie 1998)
(obstructing officer in charge of personal property); id. § 22-11-3 (obstructing
public officer); id. § 22-11-6 (obstructing law enforcement officer, jailer or
firefighter); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-515 (1997) (pointing a laser at
a law enforcement officer); Vermont: Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3001 (1998 & Supp.
2002) (impeding public officers); Washington: Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.020
(2000 & Supp. 2003) (obstructing a law enforcement officer); West Virginia: W.
Va. Code § 61-5-17 (2000 & Supp. 2003) (obstructing officer); Wisconsin: Wis.
Stat. § 946.41 (1996 & Supp. 2002) (resisting or obstructing officer); Wyoming:
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204 (Michie 2003) (interference with peace officer;
disarming peace officer).
332. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223 (2002) (resisting officers).
333. Id.
334. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-302 (2001).
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Unlike the general obstruction provisions, other offenses make it
a crime to resist arrest or detention. At least twenty states contain
such a specific provision.335 In Washington, the crime of "resisting
arrest" is committed when a person "intentionally prevents or
attempts to prevent a peace officer from lawfully arresting him.
3 36
While the Washington crime is simply stated, New Hampshire's
stricture, called "resisting arrest or detention," is somewhat more
elaborate.337 This crime prohibits a person from "knowingly or
purposely physically interfer[ing] with a person recognized to be a
law enforcement official... seeking to effect an arrest or detention
of the person or another." 3 8 Unlike the Washington crime, then, the
New Hampshire offense prohibits obstructing the arrest of another
person. In addition, the New Hampshire statute includes a provision
stating that such conduct is prohibited "regardless of whether there
is a legal basis for the arrest," and that verbal protestations alone do
not constitute an offense under that provision.3 9
Besides resisting arrest, about ten states prohibit disarming a
police officer. 34" This offense occurs in New Mexico, for instance,
335. Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 11.56.700 (2002) (resisting or interfering with
arrest); Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-103 (Michie 1997) (resisting arrest);
Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-103 (1999) (resisting arrest); Massachusetts:
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 32B (2000) (resisting arrest); Minnesota: Minn. Stat.
§ 609.50 (2003) (obstructing legal process, arrest or firefighting); Mississippi: Miss.
Code Ann. § 97-9-73 (2000) (resisting or obstructing arrest); Missouri: Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 575.150 (1995 & Supp. 2003) (resisting or interfering with arrest); Montana:
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-301 (2001) (resisting arrest); Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-904 (1995 & Supp. 2002) (resisting arrest); id. § 28-905 (operating a motor
vehicle or a vessel to avoid arrest); New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:2
(1996) (resisting arrest or detention); New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-2 (West
1995) (resisting arrest; eluding officer); North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-08-
02 (1997) (preventing arrest or discharge of other duties); Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2921.33 (Anderson 2002) (resisting arrest); Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. §
162.315 (1999) (resisting arrest); Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5104 (1983)
(resisting arrest or other law enforcement); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-
602 (1997) (resisting stop, frisk, halt, arrest, or search); Texas: Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 38.03 (Vernon 2003) (resisting arrest, search, or transportation); Utah: Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999) (interference with arresting officer): Vermont: Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3017 (1998 & Supp. 2002) (resisting arrest); id. § 3018
(hindering arrest); Washington: Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.040 (2000 & Supp.
2003) (resisting arrest).
336. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.040 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
337. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:2 (1996).
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-116 (1999) (disarming a peace officer);
Florida: Fla. Stat. ch. 843.025 (2000) (depriving officer of means of protection or
communication); Illinois: 720 I11. Comp. Stat. 5/31-la (2002) (disarming a peace
officer); Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.479b (Supp. 2003) (taking of firearm
or other weapon from peace officer or corrections officers); New Hampshire: N.H.
[Vol. 65
2004] JOHN F. DECKER 95
when a person knowingly "remov[es] a firearm or weapon from the
person of a peace officer" or "depriv[es] a peace officer of the use of
a firearm or weapon" when the officer is acting within the scope of
his duties."'
In addition to strictures protecting law enforcement officials, a
few jurisdictions have measures banning interference with other
personnel. For example, ten state codes contain statutes prohibiting
obstructions of firefighters.342 In addition, at least six states have
passed laws banning interfering with emergency medical
personnel.3 43  Finally, under Colorado law, it is also a crime to
obstruct rescue specialists and volunteers. 31
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:3-a (Supp. 2002) (taking a firearm from a law enforcement
officer); New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-27 (Michie Supp. 2001) (disarming
a peace officer); Texas: Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.14 (Vernon 2003) (taking or
attempting to take weapon from peace officer, parole officer, or community
supervision and corrections department officer);Vermont: Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §
3019 (Supp. 2002) (disarming a law enforcement officer); Washington: Wash. Rev.
Code § 9A.76.023 (2000 & Supp. 2003) (disarming a law enforcement or
corrections officer); id. § 9A.76.025 (disarming a law enforcement or corrections
officer-commission of another crime); Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204
(Michie 2003) (interference with peace officer; disarming peace officer).
341. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-27 (Michie Supp. 2001) (disarming a peace
officer).
342. California: Cal. Penal Code § 148.2 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003) (illegal
conduct at burning of building); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-104 (1999)
(obstructing a peace officer, fire fighter, emergency medical services provider,
rescue specialist, or volunteer); Delaware: Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1243 (2001)
(obstructing fire-fighting operations); Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 16-10-24.1 (1999
& Supp. 2002) (obstructing or hindering firefighters); Massachusetts: Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 268, § 32 (2000) (interference or tampering with police or fire signal
systems or motorist highways emergency aid call boxes); id. § 32A (interference
with fire fighting operations); Minnesota: Minn. Stat. § 609.50 (2003) (obstructing
legal process, arrest or firefighting); Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-908 (1995)
(interfering with a fireman on official duty); New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 195.15
(McKinney 2001) (obstructing firefighting operations); Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. §
162.255 (1999) (refusing to assist in fire-fighting operations); South Dakota: S.D.
Codified Laws § 22-11-6 (Michie 1998) (obstructing law enforcement officerjailer
or firefighter).
343. California: Cal. Penal Code § 148 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003) (resisting,
delaying or obstructing officer or emergency medical technicians); Colorado: Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 18-8-103 (1999) (resisting arrest); id. § 18-8-104 (obstructing a peace
officer, fire fighter, emergency medical services provider, rescue specialist, or
volunteer); Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 16-10-24.2 (1999 & Supp. 2002) (obstructing
or hindering emergency medical technicians or emergency medical professionals);
Indiana: Ind. Code § 35-44-3-8.5 (1998) (obstructing an emergency medical
person); Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5112 (1983) (obstructing emergency
services); South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 22-11-6.1 (Michie 1998)
(obstructing ambulance personnel).
344. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-104 (1999) (obstructing a peace officer, fire fighter,
emergency medical services provider, rescue specialist, or volunteer).
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Thus far, the offenses examined in this category have addressed
the affirmative obstruction of various personnel. However, in about
half of the states, there are laws that aim to punish those who fail to
assist or obey law enforcement officers, fire fighters, or other
emergency personnel.345 A typical example of this type of law is
Utah's provision entitled "failure to aid peace officer," which makes
it a crime when a person, "upon command by a peace officer...
unreasonably fails or refuses to aid the peace officer in effecting an
arrest or in preventing the commission of any offense by another
person. Other state laws prohibit specifically the failure to obey
345. Alabama: Ala. Code § 13A-10-5 (1994) (refusing to aid peace officer);
id. § 13A-10-6 (refusing to assist in fire control); Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 11.56.720
(2002) (refusing to assist a peace officer or judicial officer); Arizona: Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 13-2403 (2001) (refusing to aid a peace officer); id. § 13-2404 (refusing to
assist in fire control); Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-109 (Michie 1997)
(refusing to assist law enforcement officer); California: Cal. Penal Code § 150
(West 1999 & Supp. 2003) (neglect or refusal to join posse comitatus or to aid);
Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-107 (1999) (refusal to aid a peace officer);
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-167b (West 2001) (failure to assist a
peace officer or firefighter); Delaware: Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1241 (2001)
(refusing to aid a police officer); Florida: Fla. Stat. ch. 843.04 (2000) (refusing to
assist prison officers in arresting escaped convicts); id. ch. 843.06 (neglect or
refusal to aid peace officers); Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1011 (1999 & Supp.
2002) (refusing to aid a law enforcement officer); id. § 710-1012 (refusing to assist
in fire control); Illinois: 720 111. Comp. Stat. 5/31-8 (2002) (refusing to aid an
officer); Iowa: Iowa Code § 719.2 (1993 & Supp. 2002) (refusing to assist officer);
Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 24 (2000) (neglect or refusal to assist
officer or watchman); Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-304 (2001) (failure to
aid a peace officer); Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-903 (1995) (refusing to aid a
peace officer); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. 197.270 (2001) (refusal to make arrest or
to aid officer); New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-2 (Michie 2001) (refusing
to aid an officer); New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 195.10 (McKinney 2001)
(refusing to aid a peace or a police officer); Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.23
(Anderson 2002) (failure to aid a law enforcement officer); Oklahoma: Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 21, § 537 (2002) (refusing to aid officer); Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. §
162.245 (1999) (refusing to assist a peace officer); id. § 162.255 (refusing to assist
in fire-fighting operations); South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 22-11-3.1
(Michie 1998); Utah: Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-307 (1999) (failure to aid peace
officer); Virginia: Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-463 (Michie 1996) (refusal to aid officer
in execution of his office); West Virginia: W. Va. Code § 61-5-14 (2000) (refusal
of person to aid officer); Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 946.40 (1996) (refusing to aid
officer).
346. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-307 (1999).
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certain instructions, 347such as an order to stop a vehicle348 or an order
to leave the scene of an emergency.
3 49
6. Obstructing the Judicial Process
Whereas there are many laws banning the obstruction of certain
people, some states have created offenses that ban obstructions of
particular aspects of the judicial process. This category does not
include minor offenses such as breaching the peace or disturbing a
judicial proceeding. ° Rather, these laws prohibit conduct that rises
to the level of an obstruction of justice.
For instance, at least eighteen states have a law prohibiting the
simulation of legal process. 351  A person generally commits this
347. Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 16-10-30 (1999 & Supp. 2002) (refusal to obey
official request at fire or other emergency); Indiana: Ind. Code § 35-44-4-5 (Supp.
2002) (refusal to leave an emergency incident area by person not a firefighter); id.
§ 35-44-4-6 (refusal to leave an emergency incident area by a firefighter not
dispatched); Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.749a (1991 & Supp. 2003)
(failure to obey directions of police or conservation officer); Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2921.331 (Anderson 2002 & Supp. 2002) (failure to comply with order or
signal of police officer); Texas: Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.02 (Vernon 2003)
(failure to identify); Wis. Stat. § 946.415 (Supp. 2002) (failure to comply with
officer's attempt to take person into custody).
348. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.749a (1991 & Supp. 2003) (failure to obey
directions of police or conservation officer).
349. Ind. Code § 35-44-4-5 (Supp. 2002) (refusal to leave an emergency incident
area by person not a firefighter).
350. Presumably, many acts, such as the failure to appear in court, are covered
by state contempt statutes. See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 27-10-18 (procedure when
person arrested gives undertaking for appearance but fails to appear). However,
these matters are beyond the scope of this article.
351. Alabama: Ala. Code § 13A-10-131 (1994) (simulating legal process);
Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 11.56.620 (Michie 2002) (simulating legal process);
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2814 (2001) (simulating legal process); Arkansas:
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-53-116 (Michie 1997) (simulating legal process); California:
Cal. Penal Code § 146b (West 1999) (simulating official inquiries); Colorado: Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 18-8-611 (1999) (simulating legal process); Illinois: 720 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 5/32-7 (2002) (simulating legal process); Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3820
(1995) (simulating legal process); Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 524.110 (Michie
1999) (simulating legal process); Louisiana: La. R.S. § 14:353 (2003) (documents
simulating official court papers for collection purposes, sale or purchase
prohibited); Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.368 (1991 & Supp. 2003)
(preparation, issuance, service, etc. of unauthorized legal process); Minnesota:
Minn. Stat. § 609.51 (2003) (simulating legal process); Mississippi: Miss. Code
Ann. § 97-9-1 (2000) (printing, selling or distributing simulated legal documents
prohibited); Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 575.130 (1995) (simulating legal process);
Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-923 (1995) (simulating legal process); Ohio: Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.52 (Anderson 2002) (using sham legal process); Oregon:
Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.355 (1999) (simulating legal process); Wisconsin: Wis. Stat.
§ 946.68 (1996 & Supp. 2002) (simulating legal process).
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offense when he has a specific purpose to obtain something of value
and "knowingly delivers or causes to be delivered to another a
request, demand, or notice that simulates any legal process issued by
any court of this state. 352  According to Wisconsin law, "legal
process" includes a subpoena, summons, warrant, complaint, notice,
and any other document that "directs a person to perform or refrain
from performing a specified act" that can be enforced by a court or
government agency.
A few states have strictures that prohibit the obstruction of
service of process or other court orders.354  For instance, in
Tennessee, it is a crime to "intentionally prevent or obstruct an
officer of the state or any other person known to be a civil process
server in serving, or attempting to serve or execute, any legal writ or
process. 355 Finally, a small number of states also have offenses
similar to witness and jury tampering that ban tampering with
attorneys, judges, and other judicial officers.3 56
7. Falsifying or Failing to File Reports
Offenses in this category criminalize the falsification of certain
reports or the failure to file such reports. Nearly all state criminal
codes contain at least one such statute in this section.
352. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-53-116 (Michie 1997) (simulating legal process).
353. Wis. Stat. § 946.68 (1996 & Supp. 2002) (simulating legal process).
354. Illinois: 720 111. Comp. Stat. 5/31-3 (2002) (obstructing service of process);
Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3808 (1995) (obstructing legal process or official
duty); Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. § 97-9-75 (2000) (resisting service of process);
South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-320 (Law Co-op. 2003) (opposing or
resisting law enforcement officer serving process); South Dakota: S.D. Codified
Laws § 22-11-1 (Michie 1998) (resisting execution or service of process);
Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602 (1997) (prevention or obstruction of
service of legal writ or process); Texas: Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.16 (Vernon
2003) (preventing execution of civil process).
355. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602 (1997) (prevention or obstruction of service
of legal writ or process).
356. Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3815 (1995) (attempting to influence ajudicial officer); Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 524.040 (Michie 1999)
(intimidating a participant in the legal process); Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
4953.1 (Supp. 2003) (retaliation against prosecutor or judicial official); South
Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 22-11-15 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2003) (threatening
or intimidating judicial or ministerial officers or others); Utah: Utah Code Ann. §
76-8-316 (1999 & Supp. 2002) (influencing, impeding, or retaliating against ajudge
or member of the Board of Pardons and Parole); Washington: Wash. Rev. Code §
9A.72.160 (2000) (intimidating a judge).
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First, at least thirty-five states specifically prohibit the false report
of a crime. 7 Many of these statutes contain several provisions to
reflect the severity of the false report. For instance, the Wyoming
law, titled "false reporting to authorities," divides the offense into
four degrees of increasing severity.358 This law prohibits a person
357. Alabama: Ala. Code § 13A- 10-9 (1994) (false reporting to law enforcement
authorities); Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 11.56.800 (2002) (false information or report);
Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-122 (Michie 1997) (filing false report with law
enforcement agency); California: Cal. Penal Code § 148.3 (West 1999 & Supp.
2003) (false report of emergency); id. § 148.5 (West 1999) (false report of criminal
offense); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-111 (1999) (false reporting to
authorities); Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-180 (West 2001 & Supp.
2003) (falsely reporting an incident in the first degree); Delaware: Del. Code Ann.
tit. 11, § 1245 (2001 & Supp. 2003) (falsely reporting an incident); Florida: Fla.
Stat. ch. 837.05 (2000) (false reports to law enforcement authorities); Georgia: Ga.
Code Ann. § 16-10-26 (1999) (false report of a crime); id. § 16-10-24.3 (obstructing
or hindering persons making emergency telephone calls); Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 710-1015 (1999) (false reporting to law-enforcement authorities); id. § 710-
1010.5 (Supp. 2002) (interference with reporting an emergency or crime); Indiana:
Ind. Code § 35-44-2-2 (1998 & Supp. 2002) (false informing); Kansas: Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 21-3818 (1995) (falsely reporting a crime); Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 519.040 (Michie 1999) (falsely reporting an incident); Maine: Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 17-A, § 758 (West Supp. 2002) (obstructing report of crime or injury);
Maryland: Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 9-601 (2002) (interference with emergency
communication); Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 40 (2002) (reports of
crimes to law enforcement officials); Minnesota: Minn. Stat. § 609.505 (2003)
(falsely reporting crime); id. § 609.5051 (criminal alert network; dissemination of
false or misleading information); Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 575.080 (1995 &
Supp. 2003) (false reports); Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-205 (2001) (false
reports to law enforcement authorities); Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-907 (1995)
(false reporting); New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 641:4 (2001) (false
reports to law enforcement); id. § 642:10 (obstructing report of crime or injury);
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:28-4 (West 1995) (false reports to law
enforcement authorities); North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-225 (2002) (false
reports to law enforcement agencies or officers); North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code
§ 12.1-11-03 (1997 & Supp. 2001) (false information or report to law enforcement
officers or security officials); Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 589 (2002) (false
reporting of crime); Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.375 (1999) (initiating a false
report); Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4906 (1983 & Supp. 2003) (false reports
to law enforcement authorities); Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-32-2 (2002)
(false report of crime); South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 22-11-9 (Michie 1998)
(false reporting to authorities); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-502 (1997 &
Supp. 2002) (false reports); Texas: Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.08 (Vernon 2003)
(false report to peace officer or law enforcement employee); Utah: Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-8-506 (1999) (providing false information to peace officers, government
agencies, or specified professionals); Virginia: Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-461 (Michie
1996) (falsely summoning or giving false reports to law-enforcement officials);
Washington: Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.175 (2000) (making a false or misleading
statement to a public servant); Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-210 (Michie 2003)
(false reporting to authorities).
358. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-210 (Michie 2003) (false reporting to authorities).
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from "knowingly reporting falsely to a law enforcement agency or a
fire department" that: (1) a crime has been committed, (2) an
emergency exists, (3) an emergency exists, and such false report
results in serious bodily harm, or (4) an emergency exists, and such
false report results in a death.359 Under the fourth provision, a person
committing such conduct is guilty of manslaughter.3 60  Like the
Wyoming offense, most false reporting offenses require proof of
knowledge.
Besides offenses generally prohibiting false reports of crimes,
twenty three states also have offenses that prohibit false reports of
specific incidents.361 Many of these statutes prohibit false reports of
fires 362 and bombs. 363 Other state criminal codes contain similar
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Alabama: Ala. Code § 13A-10-8 (1994) (rendering a false alarm); Alaska:
Alaska Stat. § 11.56.745 (2002) (interfering with a report of a crime involving
domestic violence); California: Cal. Penal Code § 148.1 (West 1999) (false report
of secretion of explosive or facsimile bomb); id. § 148.6 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003)
(false allegations of misconduct against peace officers); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-8-110 (1999) (false report of explosives, weapons, or harmful substances);
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-180a (West 2001 & Supp. 2003) (falsely
reporting an incident resulting in serious physical injury or death); Georgia: Ga.
Code Ann. § 16-10-27 (1999) (transmitting false report of fire); id. § 16-10-28
(transmitting a false public alarm); id. § 16-10-29 (request for ambulance service
when not reasonably needed); Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1014 (1999)
(rendering a false alarm); Louisiana: La. R.S. § 14:403.3 (2003) (reports of missing
children; false reports or communications); Maryland: Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law
§ 9-604 (2002) (false alarm); Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 39 (2002)
(statements alleging motor vehicle theft); Minnesota: Minn. Stat. § 609.507 (2003)
(falsely reporting child abuse); Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 575.090 (1995 & Supp.
2003) (false bomb report); Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-204 (2001) (false
alarms to agencies of public safety); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. 197.130 (2001) (false
report by public officer); id. 197.140 (public officer making false certificate); id.
199.325 (filing false or fraudulent complaint or allegation of misconduct against
peace officer); New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644:3 (Supp. 2002) (false
public alarms); New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-20-16 (Michie 2001) (bomb
scares unlawful); North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-242 (2002) (failing to return
process or making false return); Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.14 (Anderson
2002) (making or causing false report of child abuse or neglect); id. § 2921.15
(making false allegation of peace officer misconduct); Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 4905 (1983 & Supp. 2003) (false alarms to agencies of public safety); South
Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 22-11-9.1 (Michie 1998) (false fire alarm causing
injury or death); Texas: Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.081 (Vernon 2003) (false report
to peace officer or law enforcement employee); West Virginia: W. Va. Code § 61-
6-17 (Supp. 2003) (false reports concerning bombs or other explosives); Wisconsin:
Wis. Stat. § 946.66 (Supp. 2002) (false complaints of police misconduct).
362. See, e.g., 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4905 (1983 & Supp. 2003) (false alarms to
agencies of public safety).
363. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-20-16 (Michie 2001) (bomb scares unlawful).
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provisions for false reports of child abuse,364 missing children,365 and
allegations of police misconduct.
366
Finally, a small number of states also contain specific offenses for
giving false personal information to police officers. 367 Depending on
the jurisdiction, a person can commit this crime by providing a false
368 310
name, address, "69 birth date,37° or Social Security number.371 In
California, however, the offense is stated more generally, and a
person is guilty of "false representation of identity to a peace officer"
if he "falsely represents or identifies himself . . . as another
person. 372
8. Disclosing Confidential Information
The final category of specific obstruction offenses comprises
unlawful disclosures of certain types of judicial information. For
instance, at least six state codes contain an offense prohibiting the
364. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.14 (Anderson 2002) (making or causing false
report of child abuse or neglect).
365. La. R.S. § 14:403.3 (2003) (reports of missing children; false reports or
communications); Va. Code Ann. § 37.081 (Michie 1996) (false report regarding
missing child).
366. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.15 (making false allegation of peace officer
misconduct); Wis. Stat. § 946.66 (Supp. 2002) (false complaints of police
misconduct).
367. California: Cal. Penal Code § 148.9 (West 1999) (false representation of
identity to peace officer); Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 16-10-25 (1999) (giving false
name, address, or birthdate to law enforcement officer); Louisiana: La. R.S. §
14:133.2 (2003) (misrepresentation during booking); Massachusetts: Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 268, § 34A (2002) (furnishing false name or Social Security number to
law enforcement officer or official); Minnesota: Minn. Stat. § 609.506 (2003)
(prohibiting giving peace officer false name); Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
4914 (1983 & Supp. 2003) (false identification to law enforcement authorities);
Utah: Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1999 & Supp. 2002) (false personal information
to peace officer).
368. Minnesota: Minn. Stat. § 609.506 (2003) (prohibiting giving peace officer
false name).
369. Ga. Code Ann. § 16-10-25 (1999) (giving false name, address, orbirthdate
to law enforcement officer).
370. Id.
371. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 34A (2002) (furnishing false name or Social
Security number to law enforcement officer or official).
372. California: Cal. Penal Code § 148.9 (West 1999). Note that some state
codes contain a somewhat related offense prohibiting false personation of a police
officer. See, e.g., 720 111. Comp. Stat. 5/32-5.1 (2002) (false personation of a peace
officer). However, these laws are not traditionally seen as an obstruction of justice,
and are therefore not included in this study.
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disclosure of grand jury information.373 In Idaho, a grand juror is
guilty of this crime if he "willfully discloses any evidence adduced
before the grand jury, or anything which he himself or any other
member of the grand jury may have said, or in what manner he or any
other grand juror may have voted on a matter before them. 3 74 In
other states, similar provisions also specifically prohibit the
disclosure of a deposition returned by the grand jury.375-
A handful of states also have laws criminalizing the disclosure of
other sorts of confidential information. These include indictments,376
complaints,377 depositions, 378 and court orders authorizing wiretaps.379
One state also prohibits the disclosure of information to the subject
of an investigation or possible searches or seizures.38 °
While the above offenses target those who disclose information,
a similar offense relates to the seeking out of such information. The
primary example of this is an offense in six states that prohibits the
recording of jury deliberations.381 In Louisiana, a person commits
373. Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2812 (2001) (unlawful grand jury
disclosure); Delaware: Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1273 (2001) (unlawful grand jury
disclosure); Idaho: Idaho Code § 18-4403 (1997) (disclosing proceedings before
grand jury); New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 215.70 (McKinney 2001) (unlawful
grand jury disclosure); Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 572 (2002)(disclosure of
deposition returned by grand jury); id. § 583 (disclosing proceedings of grand jury);
Washington: Wash. Rev. Code § 9.51.50 (2003) (disclosing transaction of grand
jury). It should be noted that many states contain a secrecy provision in their grand
jury legislation and punish the unlawful disclosure of grand jury information
through contempt of court. See, e.g., 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/112-6 (2002) (secrecy
of proceedings).
374. Idaho Code § 18-4403 (1997) (disclosing proceedings before grand jury).
375. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.51.60 (2003) (disclosure of deposition returned
by grand jury).
376. Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2813 (2001) (unlawful disclosure of an
indictment); Idaho: Idaho Code § 18-4402 (1997) (disclosing indictment before
arrest of defendant); Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. § 97-9-53 (2000) (penalty for
disclosing facts related to indictment); New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 215.75
(McKinney 2001) (unlawful disclosure of an indictment); Oklahoma: Okla. Stat.
tit. 21, § 582 (2002) (disclosing indictment).
377. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2813 (2001) (unlawful disclosure of an
indictment).
378. See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 571 (2002) (disclosure of deposition).
379. Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. 199.540 (2001) (notification of interception of
wire or oral communication or use of pen register or trap and trace device);
Virginia: Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-460.1 (Michie 1996) (unlawful disclosure of
existence of order authorizing wire or oral interception of communication).
380. Nev. Rev. Stat. 199.520 (2001) (disclosure of information to subject of
investigation); id. 199.530 (notification of possible search or seizure).
381. California: Cal. Penal Code § 167 (West 1999) (recording or listening to
trial jury); Louisiana: La. R.S. § 14:129.2 (2003) (recording, listening to, or
observing proceedings of grand or petit jurors while deliberating or voting); North
Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-09-05 (1997) (eavesdropping on jury
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this crime by (1) recording any grand or petit jury proceedings while
the jury is deliberating or voting, or (2) if the person is not a member
of such jury, listening to or observing any grand or petit jury
proceedings while the jury is deliberating or voting.382 This statute
also prohibits attempts to conduct such activities.
V. STATE CASE LAW INTERPRETATION OF THE BROAD
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE STATUTES
The prohibitions which specifically delineate certain conduct-
such as evidence tampering, witness tampering, and resisting law
enforcement officers-are straightforward and focused in their scope,
and therefore, they require no further explanation in this article. On
the other hand, obstruction statutes that carry very broad
language-outlawing, for instance, conduct that "in any way
obstructs or impedes""' justice-may be open to widely divergent
interpretation. In order to gain some sense of the scope of these
strictures containing such broad language, this section will explore
case law that examines and attempts to clarify the actual reach of this
type of obstruction of justice measure.
A. Types of Prohibited Conduct
1. Traditional Obstruction Conduct
In some ways, conduct prosecuted under the broadly-defined state
obstruction statutes is generally comparable to conduct punished
under the various federal obstruction provisions. 385 For instance,
tampering with a victim386 and intimidating a victim387 have been
classified as obstructions. In addition, where a defendant attempted
to "fix" a friend's criminal case by falsely informing the judge that
deliberations); Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 588 (2002) (recording of grand or
petit jury proceedings); Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5103 (1983) (unlawfully
listening into deliberations of jury); South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-360
(Law Co-op. 2003) (unauthorized recording of grand or petit jury proceedings).
382. La. R.S. § 14:129.2 (2003).
383. Id.
384. D.C. Code Ann. § 22-722(a)(6) (2001 & Supp. 2003) (prohibited acts).
385. See supra notes 31 to 147 and accompanying text.
386. Lee v. State, 501 A.2d 495, 498 (Md. 1985) (finding obstruction where
defendant, who was involved in a civil assault action, brandished a gun and
demanded that the accuser talk to the gun or be dealt with "like a man").
387. State v. Ashley, 632 A.2d 1368, 1372 (Vt. 1993) (upholding obstruction
conviction where defendant, in jail awaiting trial, called and wrote a letter to the
victim, stating that his testimony at trial would harm the victim's reputation and that
the victim's testimony could result in losing custody of the victim's daughter).
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another judge was interested in the case, the defendant obstructed
justice.3" Obstructions of justice also have been found where
defendants interfered with criminal investigations.389 For example,
where a defendant police officer was involved in an illegal gambling
operation and arranged the arrest of the undercover officer
investigating the gambling operation, this amounted to obstruction of
justice. 90
Various types of fraudulent schemes regarding police activities
can also be an obstruction of justice.3 9 For example, where a
defendant bribed a police officer with money in exchange for the
officer not enforcing certain zoning ordinances, the defendant was
guilty of conspiracy to obstruct the administration of law.3 92 Public
officials, such as judges and police officers, are even subject to the
reach of the broad obstruction laws.3 93 For instance, where a
defendant, a judge, approached a police chief and asked him to
change a speeding ticket and to give special consideration to local
drivers, the defendant's conduct amounted to obstruction. 394 In
another case, a police chief committed obstruction by arriving at the
scene of an undercover drug investigation with several marked
vehicles in order to disrupt the investigation.395 Finally, where the
defendant, a sheriff, gave liquor to a prisoner on several occasions
and permitted the prisoner to escape, the defendant's conduct
amounted to an obstruction.396
2. Broader Interpretations of Obstruction
a. Interference with Law Enforcement
In addition, many state obstruction statutes prohibit a wider range
of conduct than their federal counterpart. First, various forms of
interference with law enforcement officials can constitute an
obstruction of justice. For instance, striking or assaulting a police
388. Commonwealth v. Trolene, 397 A.2d 1200, 1204 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
389. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 369 A.2d 438, 443 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
390. Id.
391. See State v. Medina, 793 A.2d 68, 82 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2002) (upholding
obstruction conviction where defendant police officer concealed entries in gun
buyback program's logbook in connection with a scheme to steal the surrendered
guns).
392. Commonwealth v. Taraschi, 475 A.2d 744, 750 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
393. See Commonwealth v. Booth, 435 A.2d 1220, 1223 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)
(noting that the obstruction statute "has been interpreted to reach, inter alia,
malfeasance of public office").
394. Commonwealth v. Gentile, 640 A.2d 1309, 1312 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
395. People v. Dolan, 576 N.Y.S.2d 901,905 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
396. Booth, 435 A.2d at 1223.
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officer while the officer is in the lawful performance of his duties has
often been deemed an obstruction.397 Thus, where a defendant kicked
a police officer during a pat-down search,3 98 or where a defendant
struck an officer with his car during the course of a traffic stop,399
obstruction convictions were upheld. Besides assaulting an officer,
a defendant can commit an obstruction by blocking an officer's path
and refusing to move while the officer is performing his duties.'
397. See A.A.G. v. State, 668 So. 2d 122, 128 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995)
(defendant had a "combative attitude" and jumped and screamed and struck an
officer, which curtailed the officer's response to the burglar alarm); State v.
O'Kelley, 570 P.2d 805,807-08 (Ariz. 1977) (defendant kicked a university officer
who stopped his vehicle); State v. Reim, 549 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976)
(defendant struck an officer with his car during a traffic stop and later struggled
with an officer who tried to subdue the defendant); State v. Fimbres, 510 P.2d 64,
65 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (defendant bit a corrections officer in the chest while the
officer attempted to remove him from his cell); State v. Wanczyk, 493 A.2d 6,
10-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (defendant kicked an officer during a Terry
pat-down); People v. Hodge, 735 N.Y.S.2d 261, 263 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
(defendant prisoner attempted to flee from open cell, pointed a metal shank at a
correction officer and then engaged in a struggle with the officer); People v.
Cacsere, 712 N.Y.S.2d 298, 300 (N.Y. App. Term 2000) (defendant grabbed the
officer's arm while attempting to prevent the arrest of her husband); In the Matter
of Samuel VV, 629 N.Y.S.2d 843,844 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (defendant grabbed
an officer who was attempting to break up a crowd and pushed him against a car);
Willinger v. City of New Rochelle, 622 N.Y.S.2d 321, 322 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(defendant slammed a car door on the officer who stopped him); People v. Hope,
412 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (defendant knocked the glasses off
a deputy sheriff, grabbed his neck, and backed him against a wall); State v. Collins,
623 N.E.2d 1269,1270-71 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (defendant slowly moved car until
it struck the officer who stopped him); Piela v. Commonwealth, 2000 WL 343804,
2000 Va. App. LEXIS 260, *5 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (defendant, a prisoner, resisted
the officers' attempt to relocate him from his cell). But see State v. Garrison, 554
A.2d 874,877 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding that obstructing one's own
arrest is not a violating of the broadly-stated obstruction provision).
398. Wanczyk, 493 A.2d at 10-11.
399. Reim, 549 P.2d at 1051 (defendant struck an officer with his car during a
traffic stop and later struggled with an officer who tried to subdue the defendant).
400. State v. Diamond, 785 A.2d 887, 890 (N.H. 2001) (defendant, a protestor,
refused to move out of officer's path while the officer was attempting to arrest
another protester); State v. Blodgett, 523 A.2d 119, 120 (N.H. 1987) (defendant
stepped in front of an officer and pushed him away to prevent the arrest of her son);
City of Grand Forks v. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d 700, 703 (N.D. 1989) (defendant
stepped in front of an officer who was attempting to break up a party and refused
officer's orders to leave); State v. Rott, 380 N.W.2d 325, 327-28 (N.D. 1986)
(defendant obstructed a sheriffs order to repossess by blocking sheriffs route,
motioning toward a gun, raising his fist and refusing to move); City of Columbus
v. Nickles, 504 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (defendant refused
officers' orders to leave the scene of an accident and blocked paramedics who
attempted to assist a victim); State v. Pitts, 509 N.E.2d 1284, 1285 (Ohio Mun. Ct.
1986) (defendants blocked officer's entry into building to investigate woman who
shouted at the officers and threw a potato chip bag at them); State v. Pembaur, 459
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Thus, a defendant was convicted of obstruction when he blocked
officers from repossessing a mobile home by placing a tractor and a
dump truck in front of the home.4 °1
In addition, obstruction charges often have been upheld for
interferences with police investigations. For instance, where a
defendant was wiretapped to assist police in a bribery investigation,
his refusal to turn over the recorded tapes constituted an
obstruction.40 2
Finally, a defendant's intimidation of law enforcement officials
can provide the basis for an obstruction conviction. Such
intimidation has been found, for example, where eleven defendants
encircled an officer who was attempting to make an arrest.40 3 In
another interesting case, police officers attempted to enforce an
eviction order against the defendant's family.' The family members
refused to open the door for the police officers, and, while inside the
house, the defendant shouted to her mother, "They're still on our
property. Can we shoot them?"40 5 The Oregon Court of Appeals
upheld the defendant's conviction of obstruction, reasoning that the
defendant's statement placed the officers in reasonable fear for their
safety.4°6
b. Omissions
However, where a defendant did not commit an overt act but
refused to follow the orders of law enforcement, courts are
sometimes reluctant to classify such conduct as obstruction.40 7 For
instance, during a Terry stop, a defendant refused an officer's order
to sit down and instead, squatted and fled the scene.4 8 The Ohio
Court of Appeals held that the defendant in that case did not "perform
an affirmative act that directly interfered with the patrolman's duty,"
and thus, did not commit an obstruction.40 9 Similarly, where the
N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ohio 1984) (defendant, operator of a medical clinic, barred the
door of his clinic to prevent officers from serving a warrant on clinic's employees).
401. State v. Holloway, 992 S.W.2d 886, 891 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
402. State v. Cassatly, 225 A.2d 141, 145-46 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966).
403. People v. Shea, 326 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (N.Y. Ct. Sp. Sess. Yonkers 1971).
404. State v. Mattila, 712 P.2d 832, 833 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
405. Id. at 833.
406. Id. at 835.
407. See, e.g., City of Hamilton v. Hamm, 514 N.E.2d 942, 943 (Ohio Ct. App.
1986) (holding that defendant's refusal of bailiff's order to either pay a traffic fine
or sign an agreement to pay was not an "affirmative action" and thus, the defendant
did not obstruct official business).
408. State v. Gillenwater, 1998 WL 150354, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1840, *3
(Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
409. Id. at *4, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1840 at *9.
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defendant, a security guard, remained in his car and clutched the
steering wheel, refusing to follow a police officer's order to exit the
car and enter a police cruiser, the court held that the defendant's
omission did not amount to an obstruction of official business.41°
The underlying reasoning behind these cases is a sentiment that
law enforcement officials are "expected to tolerate a certain level of
uncooperativeness, especially in a free society in which the citizenry
is not obliged to be either blindly or silently obeisant to law
enforcement., 41 1  Otherwise, the broad language of some of the
obstruction statutes would justify convictions for even the most
minor omissions. For instance, in one case, officers had a search
warrant authorizing them to search a video store for obscene
materials.412 When asked to cooperate in various ways, the
defendants, the store's owners, asked whether they were required to
do so and then gave several misleading statements to the officers.413
An appellate court reversed their obstruction convictions, stating that
the defendants were not obligated to cooperate with the officers'
execution of the search warrant.414 In other cases, one defendant
refused to display his driver's license to a police officer to permit the
officer to verify his address,41 5 and another defendant turned off the
lights and refused to open the door when an officer arrived in
response to a domestic disturbance call.416 In both of these cases,
appellate courts rejected the prosecution's expanding interpretations
of the obstruction statutes and reversed the defendants' obstruction
convictions.417
On the other hand, where the defendant's omission is coupled
with affirmative acts, the defendant's conduct can form the basis of
an obstruction conviction.418 For instance, where a defendant refused
410. City of Garfield Heights v. Simpson, 611 N.E.2d 892, 896 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992).
411. State v. Davis, 749 N.E.2d 322, 324 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (Gorman, J.,
dissenting).
412. State v. Corrai, 591 N.E.2d 1325, 1326 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
413. Id.
414. Id. at 1327.
415. State v. McCrone, 580 N.E.2d 468, 470-71 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
416. City of Columbus v. Michel, 378 N.E.2d 1077, 1077-78 (Ohio Ct. App.
1978).
417. McCrone, 580 N.E.2d at 471; Michel, 378 N.E.2d at 1078.
418. See, e.g., State v. Theobald, 645 P.2d 50,51 (Utah 1982) (where defendant
failed to show his driver's license and also made threatening moves at the officer,
the defendant was guilty of obstruction); People v. Barrett, 684 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820
(N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1998) (where defendant refused to walk through a courthouse
metal detector and impeded others from going through the metal detector, the
defendant's physical interference through physical force constituted an obstruction);
State v. Wolf, 677 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (where a defendant
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officers' orders to leave the scene of his son's arrest and interfered
with the arrest by engaging in a prolonged verbal altercation that
interfered with the arrest and led the officers to fear for their safety,
the defendant's conviction for obstruction was upheld.419 In another
case, police officers responded to an emergency call in which the
defendant threatened suicide.4"' While the defendant's initial refusal
to allow the officers inside the home was not an obstruction, she also
pointed a knife at the officers and repeatedly stated, "no." Thus, the
defendant's total conduct in that case amounted to an obstruction.421
Finally, Where a defendant simply refused to be fingerprinted while
in police custody, this conduct was not obstruction." However, in
a similar case, a different court highlighted the defendant's active
resistance to the police officer's attempt to perform a fingerprint
sample, and thus, affirmed a conviction for obstruction.423
Another instance in which an omission is punishable under
obstruction statutes occurs when the omission is an independently
unlawful act.424 For example, New Jersey state law requires
motorists to produce identification upon request by law enforcement
and to obey police officers when they are enforcing the motor vehicle
codes.4251, Hence, where a defendant failed to produce identification
and failed to obey an officer's order to stop her car, the defendant's
omissions were punishable under the obstruction offense.426 In
addition; where a defendant was required to maintain and produce
records for an alcohol inspection team, the defendant's refusal to
produce ,'those records was an obstruction of governmental
administration.4 2 7 It should also be noted that a defendant's refusal
protester refused an officer's request to leave the head table at a public board of
health meeting, the court held that the defendant's refusal, when coupled with the
physical act of sitting at the table, constituted an obstruction).
419. State v. Overholt, 1999 WL 635717, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3788, *8-*9
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1999).
420. State v. Neptune, 2000 WL 502830, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1884, *2
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2000).
421. Itdat *6, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1884 at *17.
422. State v. Muldrow, 460 N.E.2d 1177, 1178 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1983).
423. People v. Santos, 700 N.Y.S.2d 381, 386 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1999).
424. See State v. Douglas, 349 N.W.2d 870, 911 (Neb. 1984) (Shanahan, J.,
Grant, J.,& Moran, D.J., dissenting) (arguing that state attorney general had an
official duty to tell the truth during an official investigation and his failure to
volunteer information was, therefore, an obstruction of governmental operations).
425. State v. Perlstein, 502 A.2d 81, 84-85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
426. Id. at 85.
427. State v. Stumpp, 493 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1985); see also
Penn. State Police, Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement v. Capek, 657 A.2d
1352, 1355 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1995) (where the defendant refused to allow Liquor
Control Enforcement agents to search behind his bar because the officers arrived
after hours wearing streetclothes, the trial court properly dismissed obstruction
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to stop when ordered to do so by police generally is not punishable
as obstruction,428 even when the defendant actively flees the police.429
c. Disorderly Conduct
Perhaps the most striking applications of the broad obstruction
statutes are those that may be considered simple disorderly conduct.
In particular, Ohio's statute, "obstructing official business, 430 as well
as the comparable local ordinances that are interpreted in lockstep
with the state statute, have led to a number of unusual prosecutions,
sparking a vigorous debate on the appropriate reach of the law. For
instance, in State v. Stayton,431 a uniformed police officer was
walking down a street, issuing citations for expired parking meter
violations, when the defendant, a woman, approached him. 32 The
officer asked if she owned the vehicle for which he was currently
writing a citation, and she answered, "No." '433 Then, despite the
officer's warning, the defendant inserted a coin into the expired meter
and said, "You're not the police. You have no authority to write
parking citations."434 The officer warned her that she could be
arrested for "repeat metering," but the defendant responded, "You've
got to be kidding. 4 35 Deciding not to ticket the vehicle, the officer
moved on to the next expired meter, and again, the defendant
charges).
428. State v. Ternes, 700 N.E.2d 435, 437 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1998) (where a
defendant, a driver, did not stop until a half mile after the officer activated his siren,
the defendant did not commit obstruction). But see State v. Davis, 749 N.E.2d 322,
323-24 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (where defendant committed a jaywalking violation
and kept walking after officers called out for him to stop, the defendant's conduct
was an obstruction).
429. People v. Tillman, 706 N.Y.S.2d 819, 821 (N.Y. Auburn City Ct. 2000)
(where officer stopped a suspect in a narcotics investigation, the suspect's flight did
not constitute an obstruction); State v. Smith, 2000 WL 381612, *4, 2000 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1840, *10 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (where defendant fled from an
investigatory stop, this was not an obstruction); State v. McCullougl 580 N.E.2d
1180, 1182 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1990) (flight, alone, from a Terry stop does not
constitute obstruction).
430. Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.31 (Anderson 2002). The statute reads:
No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent,
obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized
act within his official capacity, shall do any act which hampers or impedes
a public official in the performance of his lawful duties.
Id.
431. 709 N.E.2d 1224 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).






disobeyed the officer and inserted money into the meter.436 The
officer then handcuffed and arrested the defendant, who was later
convicted of obstructing official business.437
On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld Stayton's
conviction and rejected her argument that her conduct did not prevent
the officer from continuing to write the parking tickets.438 While the
court acknowledged a continuum of interference with law
enforcement that ranged from "fair protest" to "actual obstruction,"
the defendant in this case crossed the line between the two areas.439
After the officer moved to the second car, she "had to be aware that
she had stopped him from writing a ticket for the first one."'  The
fact that the officer "may have tolerated her antics" the first time did
not justify her continued interference, and the fact that the officer's
"patience finally wore out ... was the risk [the defendant] took."44'
Moreover, the statute prohibited "obstructing" official business rather
than "preventing" official business." 2 In dissent, one justice argued
that the officer could have ignored the defendant's aggravated
foolishness and completed writing the ticket." 3 The dissent also
noted the prosecutor's inability to name a lesser way in which
someone could obstruct a police officer, which suggested that
Stayton's minor argument should not have been punishable.'
Cases like Stayton, which appear to be no more than basic
disorderly conduct, appear frequently throughout Ohio's caselaw.
For instance, in City of Sandusky v. DeGidio,445 another defendant
had an unfortunate encounter with an officer enforcing parking
laws." 6 Here, an officer was placing chalk marks on the tires of
vehicles to determine violation of a two-hour parking ordinance." 7
The defendant, ignoring the officer's warnings, wiped the mark off
the rear tire of his truck." 8 The Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the
defendant's obstruction conviction, finding that the defendant's acts
436. Id. Stayton's account of the incident differed from the officer's account.
Id. at 1229. Stayton contended that she never questioned the officer's authority and
furthermore, that she deposited money into both meters before the officer warned
her. Id.
437. Id. at 1226. Stayton also was charged with disorderly conduct, but a jury
acquitted her of this charge. Id.
438. Id. at 1227.
439. Id. at 1227-28.
440. ld. at 1228.
441. Id. at 1227.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 1231 (Painter, J., dissenting).
444. Id.
445. 555 N.E.2d 680 (Ohio Ct. App. 680).
446. Id. at 680-681.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 681.
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were performed "with the intent and purpose of frustrating the
officer's performance of his assigned duty of enforcing the two-hour
parking ordinance.""' 9 The dissent pointed out that the prosecution
conceded that removing such marks from tires was not in violation
of a parking ordinance, and thus there was no "illegal act which
generates the policeman's duty to enforce the law. 45°
One final case illustrates the unusual application of Ohio's
obstruction law. In State v. Davis, 451 officers observed a defendant
jaywalking, and the defendant refused the officer's orders for him to
stop.4 52 In fact, the defendant "quickened his pace," and as a result,
he was arrested and convicted for obstruction.453 With little
discussion, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 54 In
dissent, one justice stated that the defendant's conduct was at a "level
of hindrance which is simply too casual, remote, or indirect to be
punishable under the statute. 455 Also, the dissent noted, had the
defendant turned and ran from the police, his flight would not have
been chargeable under the offense.
The application of the obstruction charge to seemingly minor
offenses is by no means limited to Ohio. For instance, in New York,
a defendant was charged with second-degree obstruction of
governmental administration after he released live crickets at a New
York City public auction.457 The crickets, which had been stored in
manila envelopes, spread across the auditorium floor, causing patrons
of the auction to scream, jump on chairs, and exit the auditorium.458
The defendant was a member of "Jiminy Cricket," an organization
that opposed the city's sale of vacant lots, and he argued that his
actions were a form of constitutionally-protected speech.4 59 The
court, however, upheld the charge against a motion to dismiss, stating
that the defendant's conduct obstructed and impaired the city's
auction, which was suspended as a result of his actions.46 °
449. Id.
450. Id. at 682-83 (Glasser, J., dissenting).
451. 749 N.E.2d 322 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
452. Id. at 323.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 323-24.
455. Id. at 324 (Gorman, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Stayton, 709 N.E.2d
1224, 1227 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1998).
456. Id. at 325. The dissent also stated that an officer "is expected to tolerate a
certain level of uncooperativeness, especially in a free society in which the citizenry
is not obliged to be either blindly or silently obeisant to law enforcement." Id. at
324 (quoting Stayton, 709 N.E.2d at 1227).
457. People v. Spiegel, 693 N.Y.S.2d 393, 395 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1999).
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 396.
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Finally, in a North Dakota case, State v. Purdy,4 6 ' twenty-six
people chained themselves together inside an abortion clinic to
protest activities there.4 62  One protester said that they locked
themselves up to make it more difficult for the officers to carry them
out of the building.4 63 Subsequently, several of the defendants were
charged with physical obstruction of a government function.'
According to the court, the protester's statement implied that the sole
purpose of for their lock-in was to hinder and delay the arrests of
themselves and the other protesters. 5 Thus, the court upheld the
defendants' convictions.46
These cases are important because the demonstrate the broad
reach of the obstruction statutes. Even if a person's conduct appears
to be a minor form of disorderly conduct, it can be chargeable as an
obstruction if it, in fact, hinders the performance of an official
function.
d. Speech
Generally, a person's words alone are not an obstruction of
justice under the various state statutes. This is primarily due to
constitutional concerns of vagueness and overbreadth. For example,
in State v. Smith,4 67 the prosecution alleged a defendant's "loud and
boisterous speech" obstructed a police officer's investigation of a
street fight. 68 The defendant talked over the officer, who was
speaking to someone else, and as the officer's voice became louder,
the defendant spoke more loudly as well.4 69  Following the
defendant's conviction, the Court of Appeals of Ohio looked to the
legislative intent and held that the defendant's unsworn, true oral
statements were not "acts" as contemplated by the statute.47 °
Moreover, the court stated that prohibiting the defendant's conduct
would call into question the constitutionality of the statute on
overbreadth grounds, since the First Amendment protects "a
significant amount of verbal criticisms and challenges directed at
461. 491 N.W.2d 402 (N.D. 1992).
462. Id. at 405. The protesters stated that their goals were to "save babies,"
"give the sidewalk counselors more time to talk to the girls going into the clinic,"





467. 671 N.E.2d 594 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
468. Id. at 596.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 598.
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police officers."47 In addition, prohibiting such verbal comments
would render the statute unconstitutionally vague, since there could be
no clear guidelines concerning the requisite volume of speech that
would obstruct a public officer.
4 7 2
Besides constitutional considerations, interpretations of individual
statutes also guide the validity of speech as an obstruction. For
instance, a number of New York cases have considered whether
warning of the presence of an undercover police officer constitutes an
obstruction.473 In People v. Case,474 the New York Court of Appeals
reversed an obstruction conviction of a defendant who used his CB
radio to warn two vehicles of an oncoming police radar speed trap.4 75
The court held that "mere words alone" had never been interpreted as
physical "force" or physical "interference" as required by the
obstruction statute.476 Also, the court cited statutory commentary,
which noted that the offense was intended to fill the gaps between
other specifically-defined obstructions but was not intended to be an
"overly broad catchall. 477 For these reasons, the court held that the
statute did not prohibit the defendant's conduct in this case.4 7' As the
Court wryly noted, "To say that there is a Smokey takin' pictures up
the road does not subject the speaker to a year's imprisonment."4 9
Shortly after Case, a New York trial court decided People v. Lopez,48 °
in which a defendant recognized an undercover police officer on a
subway platform and shouted a warning for all passengers to refrain
from wrongdoing.41 Although the officer claimed the defendant's
warning "blew his cover" as he was observing a youth suspected of a
graffiti offense, the court held, for policy reasons, that the defendant's
conduct did not amount to an obstruction.48 2 The risk of being
recognized is "inherent in many other similar situations" and cannot be
deemed to have interrupted or shut down governmental operations, as
the statute was intended to prohibit.48 3
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. For the first in these series of cases, see People v. Longo, 336 N.Y.S.2d 85
(N.Y. Onodondaga Co. Ct. 1971) (holding that the object of the officer's
investigation had already departed, and thus, there was insufficient evidence to
charge the defendant with obstruction).
474. 365 N.E.2d 872 (N.Y. 1977).
475. Id. at 873.
476. Id. at 874. The court decided that the modifier "physical" referred to both
"force" and "interference." Id.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 875.
479. Id. at 873.
480. 410 N.Y.S.2d 787 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1978).





Since these two cases, however, New York courts have signaled
a willingness to uphold obstruction charges against a person who
reveals the presence of undercover officers. In fact, the court upheld
a finding of obstruction in In re Davan L 4 8 4 In that case, the juvenile
defendant rode his bicycle, circling the area of an undercover drug
operation.485 After the officer warned him to leave the area, the child
shouted, "Cops, cops.., watch out, five-0, police are coming. 48 6 On
the defendant's appeal of a trial court finding of obstruction, the New
York Court of Appeals distinguished the facts from those in Case.487
Whereas Case's interference with the police activity was "attenuated
by distance, time and technology," Davan, despite being warned,
interfered with police activity that was "confined and defined" to a
particular location.488 In addition, the court referred to evidence that
Davan' s statements caused a "physical reaction and dispersal," which
could have risked his safety as well as the officers' safety.489
Therefore, the court held that Davan' s conduct was proscribed by the
obstruction of governmental administration statute. 490 The factors
contributing to obstruction in Davan-confined and defined police
activity, a previous warning, and a resulting physical
reaction-provide a framework for determining in future cases when
mere speech becomes an obstruction in New York.4 9'
In addition, most courts have also held that unsworn false
statements to law enforcement officials are not punishable under the
broad obstruction offenses.4 9' For instance, where a defendant told
484. 689 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).
485. Id. at 910.
486. Id.
487. ld. at 910-11.
488. Id. at 911.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. In People v. Hinkson, 708 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547-48 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct.
2000), a trial court dismissed obstruction charges against a defendant who,
according to the officer's complaint, "state[d] loudly" that an undercover officer
was present. Id. at 547. Relying on Davan, the court stated that obstruction
charges could have been upheld had the complaint alleged (1) interference with a
confined and defined operation, (2) that the defendant was warned, (3) that the
defendant's statements were "directed toward a known criminal activity and
assembly," or (4) that the defendant's actions caused a physical dispersal or
dispersal. Id. at 548.
492. See, e.g., People v. Gaissert, 348 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1973)
(holding that defendant's giving a false name to an officer was not an obstruction);
Commonwealth v. Shelly, 703 A.2d 499,503-04 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that
defendant's giving a false name to an officer during a traffic stop was not an
independently unlawful act and therefore was not an obstruction); Commonwealth
v. Goodman, 676 A.2d 234, 236 (Pa. 1996) (holding that defendant's giving a false
name and address to a police officer did not violate the state's change-of-name
statute, and thus, was not an independently unlawful act sufficient to justify an
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officers that he did not know the whereabouts of a runaway girl, who
was found in the car of the defendant's friend, the statement did not
amount to an obstruction.49 3 The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the
defendant's conviction, holding that his statement was not an "act"
under the obstruction law.494 Similarly, where a defendant gave false
information to a police officer which resulted in his being improperly
charged as a juvenile, the statement was not obstruction.495 There, a
New York state trial court held that the defendant had no legal duty
to speak to the officer at all.496 Moreover, as the Ohio court noted, a
false statement is not an "act" as contemplated by the obstruction
offense.497
However, where a defendant's words constitute a threat or a form
of intimidation, an obstruction conviction can be supported.498 An
Arizona court has held that speech, when not accompanied by
physical force, constitutes an obstruction
only when it is substantially equivalent to force, that is, when it is
intended to and does incite an unlawful resistance by another to the
discharge of official duty or when the speech itself by its very volume
and intensity interferes substantially with the carrying out of an
official duty.499Thus, an obstruction conviction has been upheld
where a defendant approached a meter maid on two successive days
and called her various offensive names, frightening her into not
patrolling the area.5°°
obstruction charge); but see State v. Cobb, 2003 Ohio 3034 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003)
(unreported) (affirming obstruction conviction where defendant failed to provide
an officer with a social security number, full name, and a correct birthdate).
493. State v. Huron, 591 N.E.2d 352, 354 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
494. Id.
495. People v. Ketter, 351 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1974).
496. Id.
497. Id.; see also Wilbourn v. State, 164 So. 2d 424 (Miss. 1964) (holding that
making false statements to a police officer is not in the same general nature as
"threats or force, abuse or otherwise").
498. See People v. Tarver, 591 N.Y.S.2d 907, 907-08 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(where defendant approached an officer in a threatening manner, this was an
obstruction, even though there was an officer blocking the defendant); People v.
Jiminez, 525 N.Y.S.2d 482, 485 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1988) (where defendants
placed themselves between an officer and a person being questioned by the officer,
their words constituted an obstruction by intimidation); State v. Mattila, 712 P.2d
832 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (where officers attempted to enforce an eviction order and
defendant shouted to her mother inside the house, "Can we shoot them?" the
officers were reasonably placed in fear, and thus, the defendant's acts amounted to
an obstruction); see also State v. Demers, 576 A.2d 1221, 1225 (R.I. 1990) (where
defendant and members of his church made harassing phone calls to a guardian ad
litem and the defendant cornered the guardian in her office and threatened her while
screaming Bible quotes, the defendant committed an obstruction).
499. State v. Tages, 457 P.2d 289, 292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969).
500. Commonwealth v. Mastrongelo, 414 A.2d 54, 60 (Pa. 1980).
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B. Activities and People Protected
The broadly stated obstruction laws have been interpreted to
prohibit the hindrance of a variety of public officials and functions.
Besides police officers on duty,5°r a person can obstruct the duties of
undercover agents,50 2 fire fighters,"03 alcohol inspection teams,
guardians ad litem, 50 5 truant officers, 50 6 state environmental
officers,50 7 and fish and game officers.50 8 In one case, bridge
operators employed by the city were convicted of obstructing
governmental administration when they removed important electrical
equipment from the bridge operating system, leaving the bridges in
501an open position.
In some cases, an obstruction of an official who is not mentioned
in the state code has not met the "public officer" requirement.10
However, where an officer is specially appointed51 or conducting a
joint investigation with state officers, 5 an obstruction of such a
person has been found to meet the statutory requirement.
In one interesting Pennsylvania case, a defendant, angry about a
parking ticket he had received, shouted at the meter maid and called
her obscene names on two successive days. 51 3 The meter maid, afraid
of the defendant, did not patrol the area for the next week, and
therefore, the defendant obstructed the meter maid from performing
501. See, e.g., A.A.G. v. State, 668 So. 2d 122, 125 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
502. In re Davan L.,689 N.E.2d 909, 911 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).
503. City ofColumbus v. Nickles, 504 N.E.2d 1204, 1208 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
504. People v. Stumpp, 493 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1985).
505. State v. Demers, 576 A.2d 1221, 1224 (R.I. 1990).
506. In re Michael C., 695 N.Y.S.2d 423, 424 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
507. Scarpone v. Commonwealth, 596 A.2d 892,896 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1991).
508. State v. Briggs, 790 A.2d 792, 795 (N.H. 2002); State v. Sandman, 286
P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1955).
509. People v. Siciliano, 354 N.Y.S.2d 273,278 (N.Y. City Ct. 1972). The court
rejected the claim that the defendants, who were on strike with other municipal
employees, were being prosecuted for their union activities. Id.
510. Findley v. State, 127 P. 716, 716 (Ariz. 1912) (deputy town marshal);
People v. Arvio, 321 N.Y.S.2d 382,386 (N.Y.J. Ct. 1971) (United States Selective
Service Board); People v. Garfield, 312 N.Y.S2d 830, 833 (N.Y. City Court 1970)
(federal agent).
511. People v. Lewis, 386 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1976) (special
patrolman).
512. People v. Smith, 491 N.Y.S.2d 236, 240 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1985) (federal
officer engaged in a joint federal/state task force).
513. Commonwealth v. Mastrongelo, 414 A.2d 54, 55-56 (Pa. 1980). The
defendant called the meter maid, among other things, "a fucking pig," "a nigger
lover," and a "cocksucker." Id.
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a lawful duty.' 14 In addition, In re Walter S.,515 a New York case
involved an elementary school student who faced juvenile
proceedings for obstructing his teacher during class.516 The student
uttered an obscene reply when he was asked to sit down, then shoved
the teacher and exited the classroom." 7 Although the family court
noted that the obstruction law is used "almost exclusively" in cases
involving law enforcement officials, it concluded that public school
teachers performed governmental functions and thus, the statute
could be stretched to protect them from obstructions.518
Although a particular person may be a public official, that person
must be performing an official function in order for the obstruction
charge to be valid. For instance, where a uniformed officer was
simply on patrol, a New York court held that the officer was not
performing an official function.1 9 The court in that case emphasized
that the essence of the obstruction offense is the physical interference
with an officer's "lawful duty," and not the nature of the defendant's
acts.52° Also, where an officer's initial arrest521 or investigatory
stop522 of a defendant is invalid, the officer cannot be performing an
official function.
Three related New York cases involving alleged destruction of
evidence illustrate the importance of this element of the offense. In
People v. Simon523 and People v. Vargas,524 officers approached the
respective defendants who then destroyed evidence relating to drug
offenses.525 In Simon, the defendant broke a glass pipe containing
cocaine by throwing it on the ground,52 6 and in Vargas, the defendant
threw a marijuana cigarette into a sewer.527 In each case, the
defendant's obstruction charge was dismissed because the accusatory
instrument did not allege that any official function was obstructed by
514. Id. at 56.
515. 337 N.Y.S.2d 774 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1972).
516. Id. at 775-76.
517. Id.
518. Id. at 777. However, the court dismissed the defendant's juvenile
delinquency petition because the defendant lacked the requisite intent to interfere
with the teacher. Id. In addition, the court stated that an opposite decision would
open the floodgates to force courts to address ordinary disciplinary violations. Id.
at 778.
519. People v. Joseph, 592 N.Y.S.2d 238, 242 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1992).
520. Id. at 239.
521. People v. Ailey, 350 N.Y.S.2d 981, 989 (N.Y. City Ct. 1974).
522. People v. Lupinacci, 595 N.Y.S.2d 76, 77 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
523. 547 N.Y.S.2d 199 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1989).
524. 684 N.Y.S.2d 848 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1998).
525. Simon, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 200-01; Vargas, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
526. Simon, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 200-01.
527. Vargas, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
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the defendant's conduct.528 However, in People v. Ravizee, 529 an
officer broke his finger while attempting to prevent the defendant
from swallowing a vial containing crack. 3 There, the court held that
the officer's attempt to "prevent the imminent disposal or destruction
of contraband" was an official function, and thus, the defendant's
intentional swallowing of the drug impeded the officer's duty.
531
Although all three defendants in these cases were attempting to
destroy drug-related evidence, such conduct was only an obstruction
where it impeded an "official function."
Although this element is crucial, as one court noted, the
prosecution's burden of proof regarding this element is not "onerous"
and can be satisfied by "the barest factual allegation of a police
function." '532 Thus, where an officer was attempting to seize and
preserve contraband from a defendant5 33 or take a defendant's
fingerprints,534 these acts constituted official functions. Even an off-
duty police officer who was acting as security at a dance was held to
have been conducting an official function."'
In states that have modeled its obstruction statute after the federal
omnibus clause, courts are divided regarding whether there is a
pending judicial proceeding requirement. For instance, in Maryland,
a defendant school teacher asked her aides to lie during the course of
a police investigation.5 36 However, an appellate court determined that
the state legislature intended to follow the federal obstruction
scheme, which contains a pending judicial proceeding requirement.537
Because a police investigation is conducted by the executive branch,
it could not be a judicial proceeding.5 38 A Vermont court, however,
reached the opposite conclusion in a case involving police officers
who tampered with evidence of a crime.539 In that case, the Vermont
Supreme Court examined the statute's plain meaning and determined
the legislative intent to apply the obstruction law to a broader range
of conduct than its federal counterpart.54 ° In addition, the state
legislature created only one obstruction offense-rather than a series
528. Simon, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 202; Vargas, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
529. 552 N.Y.S.2d 503 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1990).
530. Id. at 504.
531. Id. at 505.
532. People v. Joseph, 592 N.Y.S.2d 238, 240 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1992).
533. Ravizee, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
534. People v. Santos, 700 N.Y.S.2d 381, 385 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1999).
535. State v. Kurtz, 278 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Ariz. 1954).
536. State v. Pagano, 655 A.2d 55, 56 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
537. Id. at 59.
538. Id.
539. State v. O'Neill, 682 A.2d 943, 944 (Vt. 1996).
540. Id. at 946-47 (pointing out that the Vermont statute prohibits conduct that
obstructs justice in matters "already heard, presently being heard, or to be heard
before any court of the state").
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of targeted offenses like those Congress had written-which implied
the legislature's intent to broadly interpret the law.541
C. Mens Rea
States that have addressed the mens rea component of obstruction
are divided between requirements of specific intent and general
intent. For instance, Ohio,5 42 New York,543 and Rhode Island 4 4 have
held that specific intent to obstruct an official's duties is required.
For instance, in State v. Puterbaugh,545 the defendant told an officer
that the subject of the arrest warrant was not in the defendant's home,
but the officer's search revealed that the subject of the search was
sleeping in an upstairs bedroom.5 46 The Ohio Court of Appeals held
that the defendant's specific intent to obstruct the officer's duties
could be inferred from these circumstances.547
On the other hand, courts in Arizona5 4 8 and Wyoming5 49 have held
that general intent suffices to satisfy the mental state requirement.
For instance, in State v. Bell,55° a defendant tried to re-enter his car
during a traffic stop, and the officer and the defendant engaged in a
struggle in which the defendant produced three different weapons.551
The Arizona Supreme Court held that general intent was proven in
this case by the commission of the crime and the defendant's
knowledge that he was resisting a public officer.
552
D. Constitutional Concerns
Like the federal courts, state courts have overwhelmingly rejected
facial attacks on the obstruction statutes on grounds of vagueness and
541. Id. at 947.
542. See State v. Puterbaugh, 755 N.E.2d 359, 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
543. See People v. Vargas, 684 N.Y.S.2d 848, 851 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1998)
(finding that a defendant could have tossed a marijuana cigarette into a sewer
because he was finished smoking it and thus, the specific intent to obstruct the
officer-was not proven).
544. See State v. Pan, 546 A.2d 175, 182-83 (R.I. 1988) (dismissing an
obstruction charge where the defendants did not affirmatively vouch for falsified
documents presented to a grand jury, and thus, the "corrupt" intent to impede the
grand jury proceeding was not shown).
545. 755 N.E.2d 359 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
546. Id. at 360.
547. Id. at 362.
548. See State v. Mikels, 578 P.2d 174, 176 (Ariz. 1978).
549. See Smith v. State, 902 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1995).
550. 551 P.2d 548 (Ariz. 1976).
551. Id. at 549.
552. Id. at 550.
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overbreadth.5 3 However, such constitutional challenges have
succeeded as applied to a particular case. For instance, in State v.
McHugh, 54 the prosecution charged with obstruction several activists
who distributed handbills and picketed in front of ajudge's residence
in order to protest the judge's failure to release a fellow activist on
bail.55  The Vermont Supreme Court held that upholding an
obstruction charge in this case would restrict all speech intended to
influence judicial decision-making, such as letters, editorials, and
demonstrations .556 A reasonable person would not know what was
permissible under such an interpretation of the statute, and therefore,
the law was overbroad as applied in the case.557
Besides First Amendment concerns, application of obstruction
laws to particular cases can also raise Fourth Amendment issues.558
For example, in Strange v. City of Tuscaloosa,559 the officers'
warrantless search of the defendant's home was not justified by any
Fourth Amendment exception to the warrant clause and, hence, was
unconstitutional. 56" Therefore, the defendant's resistance to the
officers' entry and search of her home could not subject her to a
charge of obstruction.5 6 Likewise, where an officer did not have
probable cause to determine whether a woman was injured inside the
defendant's home, the defendant's refusal to grant the officer entry
into his home was an exercise of the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights. 56' Thus, the defendant could not properly be charged with
obstructing the administration of law.563
VI. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Many lawyers may think of obstruction ofjustice in its traditional
sense as a prohibition on crimes against the court such as destroying
evidence and witness tampering. However, even a cursory
examination of the state statutes and case law demonstrates that the
crime of obstruction is much broader than that traditional view. In
553. See, e.g., Bishop v. Golden, 302 F. Supp. 502, 506 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); State
v. Smith, 671 N.E.2d 594, 598 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
554. 635 A.2d 1200 (Vt. 1993).
555. Id. at 1200-01.
556. Id. at 1201.
557. Id. at 1202.
558. See State v. Robinson, 659 N.E.2d 1292, 1297 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that officers' warrantless entry into the defendant's apartment violated the
Fourth Amendment).
559. 652 So. 2d 773 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).
560. Id. at 776.
561. Id.




some states, the offense refers to a variety of forms of accomplice
liability.56 In other states, it is a crime that outlaws obstructionist
conduct in either broad or specific terms.565 Meanwhile, in many
states, "obstruction of justice" consists of a statutory scheme
designed to address only specific forms of conduct.566
With the variety of jurisdictions, statutes, and case law
interpretations of obstruction of justice, it is difficult to derive any
sweeping conclusions about these laws. However some general
observations are in order.
A. Statutory Considerations
To begin with, not all jurisdictions actively seek convictions under
their broad obstruction statutes. At the federal level, the obstruction of
justice omnibus clause is a powerful weapon in a prosecutor's
arsenal.5 67 Even if a defendant is not convicted under the statute, it can
show its head as a sentencing factor under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.5 68 In contrast, among the twenty-five states with general
obstruction statutes containing broad language, only a few states
demonstrate an active use of the statutes. In Ohio, New York, and
Pennsylvania, in particular, there are a plethora of reported cases
interpreting their respective obstruction laws.5 69 In many other states,
however, there are no reported appellate court opinions interpreting
their obstruction statutes suggesting that those statutes are rarely the
source of prosecutions. 5
76
Although only a few states actively prosecute under a broadly-stated
obstruction statute, obstructions ofjustice are not going unnoticed in all
the other states. Rather, most states charge obstructions under a variety
of individual statutes that target specific forms of conduct, such as
564. Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-303 (2001) (obstructing justice); Ohio:
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.32 (Anderson 2002) (obstructing justice); Utah: Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (1999 & Supp. 2002) (obstruction of justice). See supra
notes 278 to 282 and accompanying text.
565. See supra notes 236 to 277 and accompanying text for descriptions of the
state laws. Also, the federal omnibus clause in 18 U.S.C. § 1503 defines
obstruction in broad terms. See supra notes 31 to 147 and accompanying text.
566. See supra notes 285 to 383 and accompanying text for examples of the
types of offenses included in such schemes.
567. See De Marco, supra note 70, at 607-08.
568. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (1998).
569. In Ohio and New York, many trial court opinions are reported, adding to
the wealth of interpretation of the obstruction crimes.
570. These states are: Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, and Nevada. See State v.
Holloway, 992 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) ("Neither of the parties has
cited any case law that precisely addresses [the scope of the obstruction statute],
and our independent research has failed to disclose any Missouri case that interprets
either the phrase 'obstructing government operation' or the provisions of [Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 576.030 (1995) (obstructing government operations)]).
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tampering with witnesses and jurors, resisting officers, destroying
evidence, and disclosing confidential information.57' This leaves the
broadly-stated obstruction statutes to fill in the gaps by covering
conduct not specifically described in the other statutes. For example,
the New York Court of Appeals has cited commentary to that state's
general obstruction statute that describes the law as a gap-filler: "The
former Penal Law contained a number of provisions which punished
specific conduct, the effect of which was to obstruct or hamper
governmental functions. There was, however, no comprehensive
provision directed at such conduct generally. Section 195.05 [is]
designed to fill this gap. ' 57
2
B. The Importance of the Governmental Function
Regarding the broadly-stated obstruction statutes, it is sometimes
difficult to predict whether a defendant's conduct will constitute an
obstruction. While any act that makes a public officer's job more
difficult can be deemed an obstruction, some forms of conduct are
clearly outside the realm of criminal liability.
Perhaps the most important consideration in this respect is the
nature of the governmental function. In many cases, courts have
upheld obstruction convictions by focusing on the governmental
function that was affected by the defendant's conduct. For instance,
in In re Davan L.," the juvenile defendant, while riding his bicycle,
alerted the presence of undercover police officers.574 The New York
Court of Appeals stated that the legislature intended the statute to
"attach to minimal interference set in motion to frustrate police
activity. 5 75 Here, the defendant's acts caused a "physical reaction
and dispersal" that risked the officers' safety, and consequently, the
defendant committed an obstruction.576 Thus, in this case, the court
emphasized the nature of the governmental function and the effect of
the defendant's acts on the governmental function.577
Another instance in which the governmental function proved to
be the decisive element is Commonwealth v. Trolene.578 In this case,
571. See supra notes 285 to 383 and accompanying text.
572. People v. Case, 365 N.E.2d 872, 874 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977) (citations
omitted) (quoting 39 McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y. 395-96). See also Model
Penal Code § 242.1 (Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental
Function) (describing the section as a "general supplement to all other provisions
[that prohibit] particular methods of interfering with governmental functions").
573. 689 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).
574. Id. at 910.
575. Id. at 911 (emphasis added).
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. 397 A.2d 1200 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
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the defendant was convicted of obstruction when he falsely told ajudge
named Benjamin Schwartz that another judge was "interested" in Lam
and Casparro, the defendants in a case pending before Judge
Schwartz.57 9 Although Judge Schwartz testified that he did not give any
thought to the conversation with the defendant, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that the obstruction prohibition was broad enough
to cover attempts to obstruct as well as actual obstructions. 580 In support
of its assertion, the court noted that
historically the concern in this area is not only to prevent the
due administration of law from being corrupted, but also to
insulate that process from all improper attempts to influence or
intimidate, both to forestall the risk that a court officer, witness,
or juror might be corrupted, and to preserve the public integrity
of our system of justice from any appearance of impropriety.
Thus, the key to the court's decision in Trolene was the importance of
protecting the integrity of the governmental function.
Standing alone, the conduct of the defendants in Trolene and Davan
L. seem fairly insignificant. In Davan, the defendant was simply a child
riding his bicycle around the block when he announced the officers'
presence.582 In Trolene, the defendant's comments to the judge were,
at the very least, ineffective.583 However, in both cases, the courts gave
scant consideration to their conduct standing alone. Instead, the courts'
decisions focused on the government functions that were affected-in
fact or in appearance-and upheld the obstruction charges.
In addition, unlike the federal law, which is limited to pending
judicial proceedings, most state statutes prohibit the obstruction of a
"governmental function" or a "public officer."5" For instance,
Kentucky's "obstructing governmental operations" statute prohibits
obstructions of a "governmental function. 585 State courts also have
interpreted these terms broadly to cover nearly all government
functions.5 86 For instance, as long as a police officer is engaged in some
duty other than a routine patrol, he is likely performing a governmental
function within the meaning of the obstruction statute.58q
579. Id. at 1201-02.
580. Id. at 1202, 1204.
581. Id. at 1204.
582. In re Davan L., 689 N.E.2d 909, 910 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).
583. Trolene, 397 A.2d at 1202.
584. See supra notes 250 to 255 and accompanying text.
585. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519.020 (Michie 2003) (obstructing governmental
operations).
586. See supra notes 501 to 535 and accompanying text.
587. See People v. Joseph, 592 N.Y.S.2d 238, 242 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1992)




The combined effect of the emphasis on the government function
and the expansive interpretation of that requirement is that most
broadly-defined obstruction statutes have a wide reach. This explains
the surprising results in Davan, where the child alerted to the
presence of undercover officers;588 Trolene, where the defendant told
the judge another judge was "interested" in a particular case;589
Stayton, where the defendant inserted coins into parking meters
against an officer's order;5 90 Davis, where the defendant quickened
his pace when officers attempted to stop him for jaywalking;5 91 and
Spiegel, where the defendant released live crickets at a public
auction.592
C. Any Boundaries?
Assuming that a court will focus on the government function
when deciding whether particular conduct is an obstruction, are there
any boundaries to what conceivably might be punished under these
statutes? Cases like Walter S., where ajuvenile defendant shoved his
teacher and shouted an obscene phrase,5 93 and Case, where the
defendant warned drivers of a police speed trap,594 demonstrate that
some law enforcement officials and prosecutors are willing to test
those boundaries. Furthermore, cases such as Stayton, where the
defendant inserted coins into a parking meter after a police officer
warned her not to do SO, 59 5 and Davis, where the defendant refused an
officer's orders to stop for a jaywalking violation, 596 show that some
courts are generally willing to extend the boundaries of obstruction
to encompass virtually any form of conduct-subject to a few
limitations.
First, a court is more likely to find an obstruction where a
defendant's conduct is grave or dangerous than where the conduct is
rather trivial. For instance, in City of Garfield Heights v. Simpson,597
the defendant did not commit obstruction when he clutched his
steering wheel and refused an officer's order to get into a police
car.598 However, courts have consistently found obstructions where
588. In re Davan L., 689 N.E.2d 909, 910 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).
589. Commonwealth v. Trolene, 397 A.2d 1200, 1202 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
590. State v. Stayton, 709 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
591. State v. Davis, 749 N.E.2d 322, 323 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
592. People v. Spiegel, 693 N.Y.S.2d 393, 395 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1999).
593. In re Walter S., 337 N.Y.S.2d 774, 775-76 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1972).
594. People v. Case, 36 N.E.2d 872, 873 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977).
595. State v. Stayton, 709 N.E.2d 1224, 1277 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
596. State v. Davis, 749 N.E.2d 322, 323-24 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
597. 611 N.E.2d 892 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
598. Id. at 896.
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defendants have engaged in physical exchanges with a police
officer.599
Second, courts generally have reversed obstruction convictions
where the conviction would result in a possible infringement of a
constitutional right. Fourth Amendment and First Amendment
concerns are the most common rights involved.' Thus, courts
typically refuse to find obstruction where the defendant's words alone
are the basis for the charge. 1 For example, where the defendant's
spoke in an increasingly loud and boisterous manner while a police
officer was invest!gating a street fight, the defendant did not obstruct
official business.' Also, a defendant's assertion of a Fourth
Amendment right has been protected against obstruction convictions,
even where the defendant's conduct in fact obstructs the officer's
conduct. 3 For instance, where an officer did not have justification to
enter a defendant's home, the defendant did not obstruct the
administration of law when he refused to permit the officer to enter.
6°4
Third, courts are generally more protective of judicial functions
than other governmental functions. The reason for this probably stems
from the common law crime of obstruction, which prohibited acts that
interfered with the judicial process. °5 Under the federal code, this
common-law restriction remains an obstruction of'justice offense with
its requirement of a pending judicial proceeding.6  At the state level,
the increased protection for courts can be seen in cases such as
Trolene, where the defendant falsely informed a judge that another
judge was interested in a particular case. 7  In that case, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the defendant's obstruction
conviction and justified its result, in part, with the need to "preserve the
public integrit of our system of justice from any appearance of
impropriety." '
599. See supra notes 397-399 and accompanying text.
600. See supra notes 553 to 563 and accompanying text.
601. See supra notes 467 to 497 and accompanying text. In many cases, courts
do not address the First Amendment argument but instead decide the case according
to statutory interpretations. See City of Dayton v. Rogers, 398 N.E.2d 781 (Ohio
1979) (discussing intent of legislature), overruled by State v. Lazzaro, 667 N.E.2d
384 (Ohio 1996).
602. State v. Smith, 671 N.E.2d 594, 596 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
603. See, e.g., Strange v. City of Tuscaloosa, 652 So. 2d 773,776 (Ala Ct. Crim.
App. 1994) (holding that defendant's resistance to officer's warrantless entry did
not constitute obstruction).
604. State v. Berlow, 665 A.2d 404, 405 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995).
605. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Substantive Criminal Law 406 (1978); see also Model
Penal Code § 242.1, cmt. 1 (1962).
606. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000); see also supra notes 33 to 58 and accompanying
text.
607. Commonwealth v. Trolene, 397 A.2d 1200, 1201-02 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
608. Id. at 1204.
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Meanwhile, courts have not afforded police officers the same
level of protection from obstructions. In fact, some courts have held
that a police officer's duties must in fact be hindered in order to
sustain an obstruction conviction." For instance, in People v.
Lopez,610 a New York City trial court held that the defendant, who
announced the presence of an undercover police officer on a subway
platform, could not be charged with obstruction. 61 1 Even though the
defendant may have made the officer's investigation more difficult
to perform, such a risk was "inherent" in undercover operations.612
For example, the court stated,
If the People were engaged in an undercover sale of drugs
and it could be shown that the seller refused to go through
with the sale by reason of his recognition of or his
information that the buyer is an officer, can it seriously be
contended that the prospective seller and/or his informant
obstructed governmental administration? I think not.613
According to the court, the obstruction statute was not
designed for situations where the defendant simply "blew [the
officer's] cover," and therefore, the obstruction charges were
dismissed.614
While the Lopez court described the inherent risk of interference
in undercover operations, some courts have noted that officers are
generally expected to tolerate some uncooperativeness. 6 5  For
instance, in State v. Puterbaugh,616 a police officer arrived at the
defendant's home and announced that he had an arrest warrant for a
woman named Crawford. 617 The defendant stated that Crawford had
moved out of the home eight months earlier, and the officer replied
that he had spoken with Crawford the previous day at the
residence.61 '8 The defendant agreed that Crawford had been at the
home the previous day, but she had returned to her home.619
609. State v. Stephens, 387 N.E.2d 252, 253 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); City of
Dayton v. Peterson, 381 N.E.2d 1154, 1155 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1978).
610. 410 N.Y.S.2d 787 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1978).




615. See City of Dayton v. Peterson, 381 N.E.2d 1154, 1155-56 (Ohio Mun. Ct.
1978) (where the defendant's conduct forced officers to call additional crews to the
scene of the incident and transport the defendant to the police station, prepare arrest
reports, and testify at the defendant's trial, sustaining the defendant's obstruction
charge would mean that every criminal defendant would be guilty of obstruction).
616. 755 N.E.2d 359 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).





Nonetheless, the defendant consented to the officer's request to
search the home, and the officer found Crawford sleeping in an
upstairs bedroom.620 The defendant was subsequently convicted of
obstructing official business.62'
The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction,
noting that "a police officer is expected to tolerate a certain level of
uncooperativeness, especially in a free society in which the citizenry
is not obliged to be either blindly or silently obeisant to law
enforcement., 622 In this case, the officer would have needed to go
upstairs to apprehend Crawford, even if the defendant had said she
was upstairs sleeping. 623 Also, the defendant voluntarily permitted
the officer to search her home for Crawford, which "negated any
potential interference" with the officer's performance of his
duties.624
While not explicitly stated, the policy that police officers are
expected to tolerate a minimum amount of resistance resonates
throughout much of the case law.625 For instance, a defendant did
not obstruct official business when he refused to show his driver's
license to a police officer who wanted to verify his identity.626 In
reversing his obstruction conviction, the Ohio Court of Appeals
stated that "refusing to cooperate with a law enforcement officer is
not punishable conduct. 62  Similarly, where a defendant gave a
false name to a police officer and gave contradictory answers to the
officer's questions, the defendant did not commit obstruction.6 8
Finally, where a defendant's contradictory answers to a police
officer's questions simply made the completion of an accident report
more difficult, the court reversed the defendant's obstruction
conviction.62 9 In sum, where a defendant's interference with a police
officer is minor and of the type normally expected in the
performance of the officer's duties, courts sometimes make a
620. Id.
621. Id.
622. Id. at 364.
623. Id.
624. Id.
625. But see State v. Muldrow, 460 N.E.2d 1177, 1178 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1983)
(holding that defendant created a "substantial stoppage of the officer's progress"
when he refused to be fingerprinted, which prevented the officers from ascertaining
their true identities for "a matter of hours").
626. State v. McCrone, 580 N.E.2d 468, 470-71 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
627. Id. at 471 (citing Columbus v. Michel, 378 N.E.2d 1077 (Ohio Ct. App.
1978)).
628. Commonwealth v. Shelly, 703 A.2d 499, 503-04 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)
(finding that the legislature did not intend to prohibit such conduct through the
"catchall" obstruction provision).
629. Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 505 S.E.2d 388, 390 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
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common sense policy judgment that such conduct should not be
punishable under the broad obstruction statutes.63°
D. Restricting the Boundaries
Subject to the general limitations described above, there are few
indications of what conduct would not possibly be deemed an
obstruction by courts interpreting broadly-worded statutes. Although
vagueness challenges to these obstruction laws have not been
successful, the statutory language often presents issues in which the
defendants could not be deemed to have notice of the illegality of their
conduct.63 1 For example, many courts have stated that police officers
are expected to tolerate some resistance from citizens.63z But the point
at which that resistance becomes punishable under the obstruction
statutes is unclear.
Courts and legislatures concerned about the reach of these broadly-
stated obstruction statutes could limit them in several ways. First, the
courts could interpret the statutes to invariably require specific intent
to obstruct the governmental function. In many cases, the courts have
placed undue emphasis on the government function while ignoring the
mens rea element altogether. An examination into the defendant's
mental state could eliminate from the reach of obstruction cases such
as Spiegel, where the defendant may have intended to make a political
statement rather than to obstruct the public auction.633
Also, some cases in which defendants provide false answers to
officers would not be punishable under the broad obstruction
provision.634 In many these cases, defendants are not acting with intent
to obstruct justice, but instead, they are attempting to exculpate
themselves. Although not all courts have embraced this exculpatory
doctrine, application of the doctrine would limit the reach of the broad
630. However, this does not eliminate the possibility of a charge under a more
narrowly-tailored offense, such as resisting an officer. See, e.g., State v. Smith,
2000 WL 381612, *4, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1840, *12 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
(upholding a charge of using a weapon while intoxicated and dismissing a charge
of obstructing official business); Robinson v. State, 484 So.2d 1197, 1199 (Ala. Ct.
Crim. App. 1986) (rejecting challenge of conviction for obstructing governmental
operations on double jeopardy grounds regarding previous extortion conviction).
631. See supra notes 553 to 557 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Bishop v.
Golden 302 F. Supp. 502, 506 (E.D.N.Y. 1909); State v. Smith, 671 N.E.2d 594,
598 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); State v. McHugh, 635 A.2d 1200, 1201-02 (Utah 1993);
see generally, John F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other
Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws, 80 Den. U. L. Rev. 241 (2002).
632. See supra notes 615 to 630 and accompanying text.
633. People v. Spiegel, 693 N.Y.S.2d 393, 395 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1999).
634. See, e.g., State v. Cobb, 2003 Ohio 3034 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (unreported)
(affirming obstruction conviction where defendant failed to provide an officer with
a social security number, full name, and a correct birthdate).
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obstruction statutes.635 Similarly, in cases where defendants have
engaged in minor altercations with police officers during an arrest, the
defendants may have acted with intent to protect themselves, and thus,
would not have acted with intent to obstruct. 636
A legislature also could narrow the range of obstructionist conduct
by limiting the offense to conduct that "substantially" obstructs the
public officer. Thus, instances of relatively minor interference with a
police officer's duties would not be punishable under the broad
statutes. For example, the defendant protester in Diamond who stood
in the officer's way while the officer attempted to arrest another
protester, and was found guilty under a more stringent statute, could
have been found to not have substantially obstructed the officer's duty
under a broader statute.637
Finally, the offenses could be restricted to cases in which a
defendant obstructs by certain means. For instance, Hawaii's
obstruction statute requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant
obstructed governmental operations by "using or threatening to use
violence, force, or physical interference or obstacle. 638 A statute also
could prohibit obstruction by intimidation, force, or a threat of force.639
Such limitations certainly would eliminate convictions based solely on
the defendant's innocuous speech or the defendant's simple
omission.6
VII. CONCLUSION
An examination of obstruction of justice laws in the United States
reveals significant differences in their definition and scope. First,
many statutes are cast in very general terms, which opens the door to
their being used to prosecute a broad range of conduct. Meanwhile,
other strictures are comparatively focused, which may make them
635. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998) (holding
that the "exculpatory no" doctrine is not an exception to the federal crime of
making a false statement). For an example of a case upholding the exculpatory
doctrine, see People v. Alvarado, 704 N.E.2d 937 (1998) (providing false birthdates
to police falls under exculpatory doctrine).
636. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 749 N.E.2d 322, 323-24 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
(affirming conviction where defendant refused an officer's orders to stop for a
jaywalking violation); City of Grand Forks v. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d 700, 703
(N.D. 1989) (affirming conviction where defendant stepped in front of an officer
who was attempting to break up a party and refused officer's orders to leave).
637. State v. Diamond, 785 A.2d 887, 890-91 (N.H. 2001).
638. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1010 (1999 & Supp. 2002) (obstructing government
operations).
639. See supra note 243 for a list of states prohibiting obstruction by certain means.
640. See, e.g., State v. Tinghitella, 491 P.2d 834, 835 (Ariz. 1971) (affirming
obstruction conviction where defendant refused to place hands on his vehicle to
allow the police to conduct a frisk).
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useless in addressing certain unforeseen or inventive schemes designed
to undercut the effective administration of justice. Next, prosecutorial
authorities in some jurisdictions employ their obstruction legislation in
a relatively creative manner while others, if the reported decisions are
any measure, seem to turn to the anti-obstruction laws only where
certain wrongdoing neatly fits within the clear terms of the enactment.
Not surprisingly, then, many academicians, practitioners, and
students of criminal law have little understanding of the potential
reach, both good and bad, of obstruction prohibitions in their
jurisdictions. In this author's albeit most unscientific survey of the
Illinois academics, police, prosecutors, criminal defense attorneys,
judges, and students of criminal law he encounters with regularity,
most are surprised to learn the type of conduct that the Illinois
obstruction of justice law has been used to prosecute. The law has
reached, for example, swallowing illicit drugs,6"' or what a police
officer believes to be illicit drugs" upon being apprehended by police
authorities; it has also reached giving police a false name and birth date
during a traffic stop.643 That being said, if a drug courier throws his
illicit drugs, or what an officer believes is illicit drugs, out of his car
window upon police approach, has the drug courier obstructed justice?
If a driver, following a traffic stop, falsely claims he did not realize his
automobile tail light was burned out, where police can establish that he
was given a warning the previous day, does that also constitute
obstruction?
Obviously, those in law enforcement may not totally understand
what a prosecutorial gold mine may be hidden in obstruction laws.6'
And of course, defense attorneys and civil libertarians may not fully
realize the future challenges that may await them if relatively dormant
obstruction measures turn out to be the sleeping giant who is no longer
sleeping.
If these examples, some supported by Illinois case law and others
that for today remain only a hypothetical, are any gauge of the current
scope of obstruction of justice in American criminal law and its
potential force in the future, participants and observers of our criminal
justice system should not overlook the growing importance of the
crime of obstruction of justice.
641. People v. Brake, 783 N.E.2d 1084, 1086-87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
642. People v. Smith, 786 N.E.2d 1121, 1125-26 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding
that, in order to convict for obstructing justice, it is not necessary for the state to
prove that the substance the defendant swallowed, which the officer believed was
a controlled substance, was in fact a controlled substance).
643. People v. Ellis, 765 N.E.2d 991,998 (Ill. 2002) (rejecting the "exculpatory
no" doctrine).
644. In those jurisdictions with relatively narrow obstruction laws, pro-law
enforcement legislators can be expected to urge the passage of more open-ended
and far-reaching obstruction statutes.
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